

Technical Report 05-2 November 2004

# Development and Evaluation of a Single Scope Background Investigation Quality Rating Form

Daniel G. Youpa Northrop Grumman Mission Systems

Joanne C. Marshall-Mies Swan Research, Inc.

Ralph M. Carney
Defense Personnel Security Research Center

Approved for Public Distribution: Distribution Unlimited.

Research Conducted by Defense Personnel Security Research Center

# Development and Evaluation of a Single Scope Background Investigation Quality Rating Form

Daniel G. Youpa Northrop Grumman Mission Systems

> Joanne C. Marshall-Mies Swan Research, Inc.

Ralph M. Carney Defense Personnel Security Research Center

> Released by James A. Riedel Director

Defense Personnel Security Research Center 99 Pacific Street, Suite 455-E Monterey, CA 93940-2497

#### REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

#### PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1.	REPORT DATE (DD·MM·YYYY)	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED (From – To)			
	15 11 2004	Technical	January 2002 – April 2003			
4.	TITLE AND SUBTITLE		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
	Development and Evaluation of a Single Scope Background	5b. GRANT NUMBER				
	Rating Form	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER				
6.	AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
	Daniel G. Youpa Joanne C. Marshall-Mies	5e. TASK NUMBER				
	Ralph M. Carney		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7.	PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Defense Personnel Security Research Center 99 Pacific Street, Bldg. 455-E	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER TR 05-2				
	Monterey, CA 93940-2497		1100 2			
9.	SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES Defense Personnel Security Research Center	10. SPONSORING/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)				
	99 Pacific Street, Bldg. 455-E Monterey, CA 93940-2497	11. SPONSORING/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)				

- 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
- 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

#### 14. ABSTRACT

The Defense Personnel Security Research Center conducted research to develop a measure of investigation quality that can be used by agencies of the federal government as part of their personnel security programs. This effort focused on Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI). The research involved an examination of investigation procedures, quality standards, and existing evaluation tools. Ultimately, a rating form was developed to assess the quality of investigations from different providers. The Single Scope Background Investigation Quality Rating Form (SSBI-QRF) was designed so that it could be used by different agencies to give feedback to investigation providers, for supervising and training investigators, and for oversight and monitoring of investigation products. The reliability and validity of the SSBI-QRF were assessed in two workshops with senior security personnel from various government agencies. Inter-rater reliability estimates for the rating items ranged from poor to excellent. The item content and the relationship between SSBI-QRF and other items were found to be adequate. The form was revised as a result of the reliability and validity findings. Recommendations for further research, development, and use of the rating form are discussed.

#### 15. SUBJECT TERMS

Personnel security investigations, Single Scope Background Investigation, quality assurance, quality control, product evaluation

16. SECURITY CL	ASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF REPONSIBLE PERSON James A. Riedel, Director			
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE	OF ABSTRACT		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 831-657-3000			

### **Preface**

Personnel security investigations are an integral part of personnel security programs throughout the federal government because they are the basis for determining eligibility for access to classified information. The Single Scope Background Investigation is the type of investigation required for granting access to Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information. Government adjudicators use this information to decide whether or not access approval is consistent with the interests of national security. Furthermore, individuals' employment often is contingent upon being cleared at a certain access level. Therefore, in the interest of national security and fairness to persons seeking employment with programs that require access to classified information, it is imperative that investigations meet stringent quality standards. As contract investigators increasingly conduct these investigations, the need for systematic monitoring and evaluation becomes even more important for ensuring security and fairness.

To address these concerns, the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) is conducting research and developing tools to improve the quality of both personnel security investigations and adjudication. One of our goals is to develop uniform measures and procedures for assessing the quality of personnel security products. The specific objectives for this research program are to: (1) define investigation quality, (2) understand current procedures for managing quality, and (3) develop uniform quality assurance standards, measures, and procedures. These efforts will help ensure that high quality remains a cornerstone of federal personnel security programs.

This report is the second in a series of reports on the quality of personnel security products and services. The first report established a foundation for research on adjudication quality. The present report focuses on investigation quality and documents the development of the Single Scope Background Investigation Quality Rating Form (SSBI-QRF), which can be used to assess the quality of investigations from different providers based on the information in investigative reports. This project continues to lay the groundwork for future efforts aimed at evaluating and improving the quality of personnel security investigations and adjudication.

James A. Riedel Director

# Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank those who supported this study and provided valuable input. We are particularly appreciative of the adjudicators and investigators who supported and participated in the workshops. These experts attended two workshops in which they: (1) identified the dimensions or basic elements that can be used to describe the investigation product, (2) further specified and clarified these dimensions by identifying the important elements of the investigation, (3) developed a content-valid investigation quality rating form, and (4) tested the draft rating form using real investigations provided by Department of Defense Central Adjudication Facilities. Their efforts produced a reliable and valid SSBI quality rating form that can be used by different adjudication agencies and investigation providers in their quality assurance programs. Without their expertise and perseverance, this effort would not have been possible.



# **Executive Summary**

Since eligibility determinations are based primarily on the information contained in personnel security investigations, there is strong interest in ensuring that personnel security investigations are of sufficient quality to support the goals of national security. The quality of these investigations is an important concern because the current trend towards outsourcing may increase the likelihood that investigative processes and products are not uniform and consistent. To address these concerns, the Personnel Security Managers' Research Program (PSMRP) and the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) conducted research to develop a measure of investigation quality that can be used by agencies of the federal government as part of their personnel security programs. This effort focused on Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBIs) because this type of investigation is required for access to Top Secret (TS) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Access eligibility determinations at the TS and SCI levels entail the greatest risk to national security and, therefore, necessitate the highest quality investigative product upon which to base decisions.

The research described in this report involved an examination of investigation procedures, quality standards, and existing evaluation tools. The project consisted of four steps. Ultimately, a rating form was developed to assess the quality of SSBIs from different providers.

During the first step, contracts, investigations manuals, and rating criteria were reviewed, interviews were conducted with investigations personnel and adjudicators, and a quality rating form was drafted based on existing tools and criteria for assessing investigation quality. During the second step, a workshop was held with senior security personnel who reviewed and discussed the content of the draft form. The rating form was then revised based on feedback from the workshop and follow-up communications with meeting participants. The third step of the research entailed a workshop in which experts in adjudication provided data for checking the inter-rater reliability and criterion-related validity of the revised rating form. The panel of experts rated the quality of SSBIs from different providers, and examined the similarity of their ratings for the same cases. Researchers then examined the agreement between raters, shared the results with workshop participants, and facilitated a discussion about ways to improve the rating instrument. Based on the results of this workshop, the rating form and its companion rating explanation form were revised. An instruction manual that provides guidance on how to complete the forms also was developed.

The final rating form, the Single Scope Background Investigation Quality Rating Form (SSBI-QRF), is a tool for assessing the quality of SSBIs based on the information in investigative reports. The SSBI-QRF emphasizes the investigation requirements and adjudication guidelines from Executive Order 12968. It can be used to assess the quality of SSBIs along four dimensions: scope, issue resolution, presentation, and utility. Each dimension consists of a number of items, which further specify and clarify the dimension by identifying the content or specific elements that are to be rated. There are a total of 11 items on the form. Each item may be rated Satisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, or Not Applicable. Depending on the purpose of investigation quality review, an additional form, the Single Scope Background Investigation Quality Explanation Form (SSBI-QEF), may be used to record a brief explanation

for all items on the SSBI-QRF that were rated Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory. Both forms may be completed on paper or electronically.

The SSBI-QRF was designed so that it can be used by different agencies to give feedback to investigation providers, for supervising and training investigators, and for oversight and monitoring of investigation products. For example:

- Adjudicators may use the form to provide regular or periodic feedback to investigation providers;
- Supervisors and instructors can use it to provide performance feedback to investigators as part of professional development and training;
- Contract monitors may use the form to help monitor contract performance and give feedback to investigation providers;
- Independent evaluators can use it periodically to rate investigation quality as part of oversight, to assess cost-effectiveness, and for research.

This kind of systematic feedback has the potential to improve the quality of Single Scope Background Investigations so that they can better support adjudicative decision-making. Regular use of this form may enhance existing investigation quality assurance programs by making the process of evaluating investigations more systematic and analytical.

The following recommendations are proposed for the continued development and use of the SSBI-QRF.

- Field-test the latest version of the SSBI-QRF to re-evaluate its reliability and validity. Experts from different agencies and investigation providers should carry this out jointly.
- Develop explicit rating criteria and standards. More explicit definitions for the ratings associated with each item would help clarify their basis, especially if the form is used by different agencies.
- Assess the utility of using scores to indicate the quality of investigative reports along each dimension as well as overall performance. Assigning values to ratings would facilitate evaluation and reporting of findings if the form is used to rate large numbers of investigations.
- Once the SSBI-QRF is fully validated, use it to periodically assess the overall quality of
  investigations being conducted by different providers for the federal government. This
  feedback could be used to improve investigator training and to enhance communication
  between adjudicators and providers.

• Use the data and findings from SSBI-QRF research and development to help build consensus within the national security community about how investigations should be conducted and reported. This could lead to standardized Statements of Work for investigation providers, investigation reporting formats, and systematic approaches to monitoring contracts and reviewing investigation products.

# **Table of Contents**

Introduction	1
Background National Ballon Balanda As BSI Oralita	1
National Policy Related to PSI Quality	1
Purpose and Overview	3
Research Methodology	3
Results	4
Step 1: Preliminary Research on Investigation Quality	4
Step 2: Workshop to Develop a Content Valid Rating Form	6
Step 3: Workshop to Evaluate Inter-Rater Reliability and Validity	12
Final Revision of the SSBI-QRF	25
Scope Item Changes	25
Issue Resolution Item Changes	26
Presentation Item Changes	27
Utility Item Changes	27
Rating Scale	28
SSBI Quality Explanation Form	28
Instructions for Completing the SSBI-QRF and SSBI-QEF	28
Conclusion and Recommendations	28
Recommendations	31
References	33
Appendices	
Appendix A: Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information	A-1
Appendix B: Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information	B-1
Appendix C: Initial Draft Dimensions and Items for Rating the Quality of Single Scope Background Investigations	C-1
Appendix D: Content Validity Workshop Participants	D-1
Appendix E: Content Validity Workshop Agenda	E-1
Appendix F: Draft SSBI Quality Rating Form	F-1
Appendix G: Explanation Form for Marginal and Unsatisfactory Ratings	G-1

Appendix H: Inter-Rater Reliability Workshop Participants	H-1
Appendix I: SSBI Quality Rating Form Inter-Rater Reliability Workshop Agenda_	I-1
Appendix J: Item Rating Distribution Tables	J-1
Appendix K: Item Rating Distribution Graphs	K-1
Appendix L: Final SSBI Quality Rating Form (SSBI-QRF)	L-1
Appendix M: Final SSBI Quality Explanation Form (SSBI-QEF)	M-1
Appendix N: Instruction Manual for the SSBI-QRF and SSBI-QEF	N-1

# **List of Tables**

1. Background and Experience of Content Validity Workshop Participants	6
2. Scope Items After First Workshop	9
3. Issue Resolution Items After First Workshop	10
4. Presentation Items After First Workshop	10
5. Utility Items After First Workshop	11
6. Definitions of Rating Options	11
7. Recommended Adjudicative Decision Items	12
8. Background and Experience of Inter-Rater Reliability Workshop Participants	13
9. Descriptive Statistics for Rating Form Items Across Cases	16
10. Kappa Values for Items Across Cases	20
11. Adequacy of Investigations by Organization Type (Item 4.1)	23
12. Correlations of SSBI Rating Form Items with Criterion Measures	24
13. Items for Rating Scope	26
14. Items for Rating Issue Resolution	27
15. Items for Rating Presentation	27
16. Items for Rating Utility	28
List of Figures	
Response Distributions for Items Across Cases	17
2. Highest Percent Agreement for Each Item by Case	18



### Introduction

# Background

Executive Order 12968, *Access to Classified Information* (1997), sets the standard for eligibility for access to classified information. Since 1997, this standard has been met through the application of investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines approved by the President. The executive order applies to all military, civilian government, and contractor personnel with access to classified information. Since access eligibility determinations are based primarily on the information contained in personnel security investigations, there is strong interest in ensuring that investigations are of uniform and sufficient quality to support the goals of national security.

Investigation quality has become a more important issue because of the current trend towards outsourcing of investigations and the requirement for reciprocity of eligibility determinations across federal agencies. Private contractors increasingly conduct personnel security investigations for the government, and yet there is a concern for uniformity and standardization so that security clearances are interchangeable between agencies. At present, there is no standard method to assess the quality of investigations that the government receives from its suppliers.

To address these concerns, the Personnel Security Managers' Research Program (PSMRP) and the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) conducted research on quality assurance in national personnel security investigations. The objective of this research was to develop a measure of investigation quality that could be used by agencies of the federal government as part of their personnel security programs. This effort focused on Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBIs) because this type of investigation is required for access to Top Secret (TS) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Access eligibility determinations at the TS and SCI levels entail the greatest risk to national security, and, therefore, necessitate the highest quality investigative product upon which to base decisions.

# **National Policy Related to PSI Quality**

The requirements and standards for quality in personnel security investigations conducted by the federal government are addressed in four foundational documents.

• The Privacy Act of 1974. The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. section 552a) requires records maintained on individuals by the federal government to be reasonably *timely*, *relevant*, *accurate*, and *complete* in order to ensure: (a) fairness in determinations made by government agencies and (b) the utility of the information for conducting official business. Timeliness, relevance, accuracy, and completeness are not defined in the Privacy Act, however, and must be defined in directives and regulations of the agencies responsible for personnel security functions.

- Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information. Executive Order 12968 established a uniform federal personnel security program, which led to the development of investigative standards by the Security Policy Board (SPB). The President signed these standards in 1997. The investigative standards specify the scope and requirements for conducting background investigations to determine eligibility for access to classified information. The requirements for SSBIs, including the 16 investigative standards and their definitions, are presented in Appendix A of this report. These investigative standards do not specify how to conduct each listed element, nor do they describe the content of the inquiry. Standards for methods of investigation and techniques for eliciting information are established by agencies responsible for providing investigations.
- Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information. Executive Order 12968 also led to the development of adjudicative guidelines by the SPB. The Adjudicative Guidelines, approved by the President in 1997, ultimately provide direction for the types of questions to be asked in an investigation by specifying the information needed for adjudication. Thirteen areas of security concern are listed in the Adjudicative Guidelines. For each guideline, the security concerns are defined, and disqualifying and mitigating conditions are specified. These definitions, security concerns, and disqualifying and mitigating conditions are provided in Appendix B of this report.
- Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4. DCID 6/4 (Annex A) established the SPB investigative standards as the requirement for personnel who need access at the SCI level. Annex C of the directive contains the Adjudicative Guidelines that were approved by the President. Also, DCID 6/4 (Annex B) includes quality control guidance for SSBIs. A quality investigation is defined as, "a thorough and comprehensive collection of favorable and unfavorable information from a variety of sources, past and present, that may include employment(s), reference(s), neighborhood(s), credit, police, and the Subject." The directive provides guidance for collecting information from typical investigative sources. It also briefly describes three procedures that may be employed for quality control: case review, supervisory ride-along, and source recontact. The rating form described in the current report was designed to be part of an investigation case review program.

In order to systematically evaluate the quality of personnel security investigations, there must be clear standards that serve as the basis for determining whether or not a particular product is acceptable. The documents described in this section provide some of the necessary criteria. These guidelines served as the foundation for development of the investigation quality measure described in the remainder of this report.

## **Purpose and Overview**

The purposes of this study were to:

- 1. Develop a form that can be used to rate the quality of Single Scope Background Investigations from different providers;
- 2. Develop an instruction manual to accompany the rating form;
- 3. Produce a briefing and final report documenting the development, reliability, and validation of the SSBI Quality Rating Form (SSBI-QRF).

This report describes the development and preliminary field-testing of the SSBI-QRF, including the study methodology, preliminary research on investigation quality, the design and content validation of a draft SSBI quality rating form, efforts to assess the draft form's reliability and validity, as well as the development of a final quality rating form and instructions manual. The final section of the report presents conclusions and recommendations for further development and use of the rating instrument.

# **Research Methodology**

Research and development of the SSBI-QRF consisted of the following four (4) steps.

- Step 1. The first step involved a review of documents that describe personnel security investigations in government agencies, as well as interviews with security personnel with expertise in investigations and adjudication. This step resulted in the development of an initial draft set of dimensions and items to assess the quality of SSBIs.
- Step 2. The second step convened a workshop of individuals with expertise in investigations and adjudication. These experts reviewed and assessed the content validity of the draft dimensions and items. That is, they judged how well the items sampled the domain of interest. The draft rating form was then revised so that it could be field-tested in Step 3 of the research.
- Step 3. The third step convened a second workshop of individuals with expertise primarily in adjudication. Workshop participants used the content-valid instrument produced during the first workshop to assess actual SSBIs from different providers. The SSBIs were obtained from DoD Central Adjudication Facilities (CAFs). The experts' ratings allowed researchers to estimate the inter-rater reliability and criterion-related validity of the items on the form. Inter-rater reliability is an estimate of the consistency of judgments by different raters. Criterion-related, or concurrent, validity is an estimate of the relationship between ratings and criterion measures of the same constructs. In addition, the workshop participants' feedback and discussion provided valuable input for modifying the draft form in order to improve its reliability and validity.

Step 4. The fourth and final step of the research examined the results of Step 3 and developed a revised instrument for rating the quality of investigations. The rating form was designed to assess the quality of SSBIs from different providers based on information in investigative reports. The goal was to develop an efficient and effective means of assessing investigation quality with an emphasis on customer (e.g., adjudicator) satisfaction. This quality rating approach was adopted because it can be used to achieve a variety of objectives, to include training, professional development, contract monitoring, and to gauge customer satisfaction. Second, it provides a standard set of ratings that may be comparable across providers. If similar criteria are used to rate investigative reports, the results may be used to compare the quality of investigations from different providers. Third, rating forms can be designed so that they are easy and relatively inexpensive to complete.

The following sections describe the specific methodology and results of each of these research steps.

#### Results

## **Step 1: Preliminary Research on Investigation Quality**

The purpose of this step in the research was to better understand how different agencies conduct investigations, and to gather information about existing procedures for ensuring investigation quality. This involved the review of existing documents and interviews with investigation and adjudication experts.

#### **Document Review and Interviews**

The following investigations manuals were reviewed for information about personnel security investigation and quality assurance procedures: Defense Security Service (DSS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State (DOS), and Office of Personnel Management (OPM). These manuals contained information primarily about investigative sources and methods. Quality assurance procedures were addressed to a limited extent, as these documents for the most part appeared to be written for field investigators as opposed to administrative and supervisory personnel responsible for quality control functions. Several statements of work for procuring contractor support for investigations also were reviewed for information about investigation and quality assurance procedures. Statements of work were received from the DSS, OPM, and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). These statements of work stipulated similar investigation requirements, and reflected, either explicitly or through referenced source documents, national investigative standards and requirements for quality control.

Existing quality standards and assessment tools (including evaluation criteria) also were collected and reviewed. This review was performed to document the current state of affairs in investigation quality assurance and to set the stage for developing additional measures of investigation quality. Documents were reviewed from the Department of Energy (DOE), CIA, SPB, DOS, OPM, and the DoD, to include the NRO,

DSS, CAFs, and PERSEREC. Approximately 500 potential items for assessing investigation quality were compiled from this document review.

Finally, interviews were conducted with investigation and adjudication personnel to followup on questions concerning investigation standards and procedures. Government personnel and contractors were interviewed at the CIA, DOS, DSS, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), OPM, DOE, NRO, and the DoD.

Based upon the results of the document review and interviews, it was possible to characterize, in a general sense, the basic standards of investigation quality for the personnel security community. This led to the development of an initial draft quality rating form based on the information provided by participating agencies.

# **Development of Draft Rating Dimensions and Items**

Approximately 500 potential rating items from existing forms and documents were synthesized and categorized based on their content into nine investigation quality dimensions. For purposes of this research, dimensions were defined as the *basic elements* that can be used to describe the investigation product, including both its content and format. The original nine dimensions and their definitions were:

- **1. Identity**. The investigation established the identity of the Subject, for example, by verifying Subject identifiers.
- **2. Coverage**. All required sources were covered during the investigation.
- **Expansion**. The investigation was expanded to cover any developed information of security concern.
- **4. Resolution**. All discrepant, unclear, illogical, and potentially disqualifying information developed in the investigation was resolved in the report.
- **Substantiation**. Obtained or attempted to obtain corroborating sources for all issue, discrepant, and mitigating information.
- **6. Documentation**. All necessary documentation was obtained as part of the investigation.
- **7. Presentation**. The report was well organized and information was easy to find.
- **8. Whole Person**. The report presented information in a way that provided a meaningful picture of the Subject.
- **9. Utility**. The report provided enough relevant information to allow an eligibility determination to be made with confidence.

Each of these nine dimensions, in turn, consisted of a number of items, which further specified and clarified the dimensions by identifying the content or specific elements of the investigation to be rated. Appendix C presents the initial draft rating form, consisting of the nine dimensions and 27 items.

## Step 2: Workshop to Develop a Content Valid Rating Form

The second step convened a workshop of individuals with expertise in investigations and adjudication that reviewed and assessed the content validity, or appropriateness, of the initial draft dimensions and items. These experts revised the draft form so that it would be more suitable for assessing SSBI quality.

## **Background and Experience of Workshop Participants**

Twenty-three senior security personnel from 16 government agencies participated in a two-day workshop in October 2002 to evaluate the content-validity of the draft form for assessing investigation quality. These security personnel represented four DoD CAFs; three intelligence community (IC) agencies, including NRO and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); five other government agencies; two government investigation providers; and one research activity. (See Appendix D for a list of participating agencies). Table 1 summarizes the background and experience of the workshop participants.

Table 1
Background and Experience of Content Validity Workshop Participants (N = 23)

Major Functional Areas	Count	%
Adjudication	16	70
Investigations	13	57
Policy	10	43
Training	7	30
Contract Administration/Management	6	26
Other	7	30
Years of experience in adjudication or investigation		Mean
rears of experience in aujunication of investigation		18.5

Note. Percentages do not sum to 100% since participants could have experience in more than one area.

The participants were well qualified to assess the content-validity of the rating dimensions and items, having an average of 18.5 years of experience in adjudication and/or investigations. Participant experience ranged from 2 to 35 years. Most (almost two-thirds) were in adjudication positions, such as branch manager/chief/team leader, supervisory personnel security specialists, and personnel security specialists/officers. One-third worked in investigation positions, such as chief of special investigations, chief of background investigations, team leader, investigation field manager, and investigator. Less than one-twentieth were policy officers or researchers. Areas of expertise included

adjudication, investigation, policy, training, contract management, quality assurance, and/or counterintelligence.

# **Workshop Methodology and Results**

Three researchers facilitated the workshop, following the agenda presented in Appendix E. On the first day of the workshop, participants were introduced to the research program, its goals and objectives, and the draft quality dimensions and item definitions. Then, they reviewed and edited the nine dimensions and their definitions by answering the following four questions.

- 1. Do the dimensions describe the investigation product in terms of its utility for adjudication and contract monitoring of investigation providers?
- 2. Is the draft list of dimensions comprehensive?
- 3. Should any dimensions be redefined, deleted, added, combined, or separated?
- 4. Do these dimensions apply to the entire personnel security community?

This discussion led to collapsing the nine dimensions into a more streamlined list of four. The Identity and Coverage dimensions were combined into the Scope dimension; Expansion, Resolution, and Substantiation were combined into the Issue Resolution dimension; Documentation and Presentation were combined into the Presentation dimension; and Whole Person and Utility were combined into the Utility dimension. The experts agreed that the quality of investigations could be adequately assessed using the resulting four dimensions: Scope, Issue Resolution, Presentation, and Utility.

The participants then broke into four groups, with each group responsible for reviewing and editing the draft items within one of the four dimensions. As part of the review, they addressed the following questions.

- 1. Do the items further describe the investigation product in terms of its utility for adjudication and contract monitoring?
- 2. Are the items observable, concrete, and measurable?
- 3. Is the draft list of items comprehensive?
- 4. Should any items be redefined, deleted, added, combined, or separated?
- 5. Do these items apply to the entire personnel security community?

Each group presented its rationale and recommendations concerning items that should be used to further specify and clarify a dimension. Feedback and discussion of these recommendations resulted in a set of 17 items across the four dimensions.

During the second day of the workshop, the participants again worked in small groups to devise a set of rating criteria that would provide specifications for evaluating the quality of performance on each item. The rating criteria for each item were intended to:

- Define three different levels of quality;
- Be important examples of the item;
- Be concrete, observable, and measurable;
- Be at the appropriate level of specificity;
- If necessary, be defined differently by community; and
- Describe the item in terms of its completeness, accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and utility.

Then each group presented its rationale and recommendations concerning the rating criteria for each item within a dimension. Feedback and discussion of these recommendations led to a consensus that the rating criteria for each item (i.e., the criteria used to judge whether or not performance was adequate) should be determined by the reviewing organization because some criteria were likely to be unique for each investigation customer.

#### **Resultant Content-Valid Draft Rating Form**

Through follow-up telephone conversations and email with workshop participants, the rating form was further revised in the weeks following the workshop. Based on the information collected for this study and validated by personnel security experts, a revised SSBI quality rating form was developed to assess investigation quality along four dimensions: scope, issue resolution, presentation, and utility (see Appendix F).

**Scope**. The first dimension, Scope, was composed of seven items. The term "scope" is used in a number of ways within the personnel security community. For purposes of this form, scope was defined as *basic source coverage and reporting requirements that enable adjudicators to make reasonable clearance eligibility determinations*. This definition was meant to be relatively inclusive. Table 2 lists the items that defined the scope dimension. Item 1.1 concerned verification of the Subject's citizenship and identity, basic requirements of any investigation that should be documented in the investigative report. Item 1.2 addressed overall performance of the national investigative standards. Item 1.3, using the subject interview as the reference

point, assessed the currency of the reported information. Items 1.4 and 1.5 addressed coverage and reporting of reference interviews. Item 1.6 concerned the adequacy of reporting investigative sources and methods. Inclusion of appropriate documentation was rated in Item 1.7.

# Table 2 Scope Items After First Workshop

- 1.1 **Verification of Citizenship and Identity**. The report clearly indicated that Subject's citizenship and identity were verified.
- 1.2 **Conduct of Leads**. All investigative leads required by the National Investigative Standards were conducted during the investigation, and unsuccessful efforts to accomplish leads were clearly indicated and explained in the report.
- 1.3 **Currency of Information**. Information in the report was current relative to the date of the Subject interview.
- 1.4 **References Covered Scope**. Listed and developed references cumulatively covered the required investigative scope.
- 1.5 **Explanation of Association with Subject**. Each reference entry clearly explained the nature, dates, and frequency of the reference's association with the Subject, to include a recommendation with comments if required.
- 1.6 **Description of Sources and Methods**. The sources and methods used to obtain information were clearly described in the report.
- 1.7 **Documentation Provided**. All necessary documentation was provided as part of the investigation, including other investigative records and source documents as appropriate.

Issue Resolution. The second dimension, Issue Resolution, was made up of three items (shown in Table 3) that assessed the quality of expansion, substantiation, and resolution of issues based on the information in investigative reports. Item 2.1 was used to rate the adequacy of follow-up questioning and lead expansion given the security relevant information presented in the case. Item 2.2 concerned corroboration and verification of relevant information. The overall sufficiency of issue resolution was addressed in Item 2.3.

# Table 3 Issue Resolution Items After First Workshop

- 2.1 **Expansion of Leads**. Follow-up questions were asked and/or additional leads were conducted to cover all relevant information of concern, including any potentially disqualifying, discrepant, clarifying, and mitigating information.
- 2.2 **Verification of Security Relevant Information.** Security relevant information was corroborated and/or verified as necessary.
- 2.3 **Resolution of Issues.** All discrepant, unclear, illogical, and potentially disqualifying information developed in the investigation was resolved to the extent possible.

**Presentation**. Five items were employed to assess the fourth dimension, Presentation (see Table 4). This dimension was used to rate the appearance, or packaging, of information in investigative reports. The utility of a report is diminished if the information is presented in an unclear or disorganized fashion. The quality of presentation also may affect the efficiency of the adjudication process in that it takes longer to process a case that is disorganized, unclear, or contains irrelevant information. The first three items in this category addressed the organization, clarity, and relevance of information provided in a report. Items 3.4 and 3.5 dealt with agency specific reporting requirements for protected sources and investigator observations.

# Table 4 Presentation Items After First Workshop

- 3.1 **Report Organization**. The report was well organized and information was easy to find.
- 3.2 **Report Clarity and Accuracy.** The report was clearly written, internally consistent, and free of major errors.
- 3.3 **Report Legibility.** All information and documents in the report were legible, appropriate, and relevant.
- 3.4 **Confidential and Protected Sources.** Confidential and other protected sources were reported according to agency guidelines.
- 3.5 **Investigator Observations Documented**. Investigator observations were documented in accordance with agency guidelines.

*Utility*. Two items, shown in Table 5, defined the Utility dimension. This dimension assessed the overall usefulness of investigative reports to adjudicators, including the timeliness of the information provided. Item 4.1 rated the overall completeness and relevance of the information in the report. Ultimately, the question is whether or not the report enables an adjudicator to make a reasonable clearance eligibility determination. Item 4.2 concerned the timeliness of the investigation.

# Table 5 Utility Items After First Workshop

- 4.1 **Completeness of Information.** The report provided enough relevant information to allow a clearance eligibility determination to be made.
- 4.2 **Timeliness of Investigation and Report.** The investigation was completed and the report submitted in a timely manner.

**Rating Scale**. The rating form included a four-point scale to rate the performance of each item. Item performance may be rated as Unsatisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, Satisfactory, or Not Applicable (NA). Table 6 defines these ratings.

# **Table 6 Definitions of Rating Options**

**Unsatisfactory.** An Unsatisfactory rating means that available information is <u>not sufficient</u> and corrective action may be needed before an eligibility determination can be made.

**Marginally Satisfactory.** A Marginally Satisfactory rating means that available information is barely sufficient for making an eligibility determination.

**Satisfactory.** A Satisfactory rating means that the information in the report is <u>definitely</u> sufficient for making an eligibility determination.

**NA.** A NA rating is used when an item is <u>not applicable</u> in a particular investigation.

Experts disagreed somewhat about inclusion of the Marginally Satisfactory rating option. Some said that item performance is either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory, and that Marginally Satisfactory is essentially meaningless. Others argued that the Marginally Satisfactory rating may be important to distinguish between investigations that are excellent, fully meeting the expectations of the reviewer, and those that are adequate but in need of improvement. Ultimately, the purpose for making the ratings will determine the utility of the Marginally Satisfactory rating. For example, if the ratings are made by adjudicators in order to provide general feedback to an investigation provider, it may be sufficient to indicate that the investigations are either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory, disregarding the Marginally Satisfactory option. However, if the ratings are used to provide feedback to individual investigators, it may be beneficial to use the Marginally Satisfactory rating to better communicate to the investigator his/her strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, the Marginally Satisfactory rating remained on the rating form, its use to be determined by the reviewer.

The resulting rating form was designed to be comprehensive, general in its content, and to cover all of the important aspects of investigation quality with as few items as possible. In addition, a fifth dimension, *Recommended Adjudicative Decision*, was added to aid in the assessment of the rating form itself. This dimension consisted of

four dichotomous response (Yes/No) items that described the decision recommended by the reviewer (see Table 7).

# Table 7 Recommended Adjudicative Decision Items

- 5.1 Recommend Approval.
- 5.2 Recommend Disapproval.
- 5.3 Recommend Conditional Approval with Warning.
- 5.4 Recommend No Decision; Return Investigation to Provider.

## Step 3: Workshop to Evaluate Inter-Rater Reliability and Validity

In the third step of the research, another workshop of individuals with expertise primarily in adjudication was convened. The purpose of this workshop was to conduct a test to see if different raters evaluated the quality of the same investigations in the same way using the draft rating form. These individuals rated actual SSBIs using the draft form developed in the first workshop, and provided feedback on the utility of the form itself.

In general, the reliability of an instrument is the degree to which its measurements are repeatable under similar conditions. In assessing reliability, then, the question is whether or not similar measurements or answers are obtained when the process is repeated (e.g., by different raters). While reliability is an important aspect of any type of measurement, it is not sufficient. Measurement also must be valid. In this case, the rating form must actually measure the quality of investigation products. In other words, validity refers to the accuracy of the measurements, whether or not they hit the intended target. For instance, in shooting a rifle the rounds could produce a tight group in the outer ring of the target while aiming for the center. This would be reliable, in that it was repeatable; but it would not be valid. In order for the shooting to be considered reliable and valid, most of the rounds would have to hit the point of aim (i.e., form a tight group in the center of the target). The items on the SSBI-QRF are intended to reliably measure important aspects of investigation quality. Step 3 of the research was designed to test this proposition.

## **Background and Experience of Workshop Participants**

Nineteen senior security personnel from 10 government agencies participated in a two-day workshop in February 2003 to evaluate the inter-rater reliability and criterion-related validity of the draft form for assessing investigation quality. These security personnel represented five DoD, three IC, and two other government agencies that regularly perform security clearance adjudication (See Appendix H for a list of the participating agencies).

Table 8 summarizes the background and experience of the workshop participants. Having an average of 11.05 years of experience in adjudication and investigation, the participants were well qualified to rate the quality of investigations and to provide feedback on the quality rating form and its utility. Most of the participants (approximately three-fifths) were in adjudication positions, such as branch chief, team leader, and senior adjudicator. Approximately one-tenth were in quality assurance coordinator positions, and one-fourth held other positions. Almost all of the participants (95%) identified adjudication as their major functional area. In addition, almost two-fifths (37%) performed investigation functions, one-fourth (26%) worked in policy, one-fourth (26%) worked in training, and one-tenth (11%) performed contract administration and management. Three-fourths (79%) were responsible for collateral clearance eligibility, and almost three-fifths (58%) for SCI access.

Table 8
Background and Experience of Inter-Rater Reliability Workshop Participants (N = 19)

Major Functional Areas	Count	%
Adjudication	18	95
Investigations	7	37
Policy	5	26
Training	5	26
Contract Administration/Management	2	11
Other	3	16
Years of Experience in adjudication or investigation		Mean
rears or Experience in adjudication of investigation		11.05

Note. Percentages do not sum to 100% since participants could have experience in more than one area.

### **Workshop Methodology**

Three researchers facilitated the workshop, following the agenda presented in Appendix I. On the first day of the workshop, the participants were introduced to the research program, its goals and objectives, and the SSBI quality rating form that resulted from the previous workshop. Then, they used the form to rate the quality of 12 SSBIs from different providers.

In preparation for the workshop, several government agencies were asked to provide at least five recent initial SSBIs from their provider(s). If the agency only used a single provider, all five investigations were to be from that provider. However, if the agency adjudicated investigations from multiple providers (e.g., OPM and DSS), some investigations were to be from each provider. The following instructions guided agencies in the selection of cases.

1. All of the cases should be *recent investigations* and should contain *adverse information*.

- 2. Two of the cases should be considered clearly *Unsatisfactory* by an experienced adjudicator. One of these cases should be deficient primarily because of *Scope* problems, and the other should be deficient primarily because of problems with *Issue Resolution*.
- 3. Two of the cases should be considered *Marginally Satisfactory* by an experienced adjudicator. One of these cases should be deficient primarily because of *Scope* problems, and the other because of problems with *Issue Resolution*.
- 4. One of the cases should be considered *Satisfactory* by an experienced adjudicator.
- 5. If possible, at least one case should have some *Presentation* problems. This case could be one of the five cases described above, or it could be a sixth case.

The agencies were asked to send the entire investigation file, including the investigative report and all of the supporting documents submitted by the provider(s), as well as a SSBI quality rating form completed by an experienced adjudicator. They were informed that this information was to be used by PERSEREC for an upcoming workshop. In response to this request, 26 cases from three different providers (i.e., DSS, OPM, USIS) were received from six adjudication facilities:

- Army Central Clearance Facility (CCF);
- Department of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility (DONCAF);
- Air Force Central Adjudication Facility (AFCAF);
- Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA);
- Washington Headquarters Service (WHS); and
- National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

After a thorough review, 12 cases were selected for the workshop; an additional eight cases were selected as backups as time allowed. Cases were selected to represent the participating adjudication facilities and providers, as well as to include investigations with potential quality problems in different areas. Of these 12 cases, three were rated by the submitting agency as Satisfactory, three as Marginally Satisfactory, and six as Unsatisfactory. Four cases each were prepared by DSS, OPM, and USIS. The order of the 12 cases was counterbalanced so that one-half of the participants rated the cases ordered 1 to 12 and one-half rated the cases ordered 12 to 1. Accompanying the rating form was a second form on which reviewers could record explanations for Marginally Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory ratings (Appendix G). Based on the results of this second workshop, a final version of the rating form was developed.

The better portion of Day 1 of the workshop was required for the experts to rate the 12 cases. A few experts also rated some of the backup cases. At the end of Day 1, the researchers compiled the rating results and calculated the frequencies and percentages of ratings by case and item. The results of this analysis provided the basis for the group discussion at the beginning of Day 2. This discussion focused on:

- 1. Difficulties encountered in using the rating form, including the ease of use and perceived utility of different items;
- 2. Explanations for inconsistencies in ratings of items for selected cases;
- 3. Suggestions of ways to improve the rating form; and
- 4. Strategies for implementing the form.

### **Rating Form Inter-Rater Reliability**

For purposes of the reliability and validity analyses, the experts' ratings were coded so that a value of "3" represented a Satisfactory rating; a "2" represented a Marginally Satisfactory rating; and a "1" represented an Unsatisfactory rating. Thus, the highest values represent the most satisfactory and the lowest values represent the least satisfactory investigative reports. The NA ratings were included in some, but not all, of the analyses. It is noteworthy that the reliability estimates for the reported ratings may be somewhat attenuated because the investigations used in this study were relatively complex cases with derogatory information. Inter-rater reliability estimates may have been greater had less complex cases been included.

*Item Descriptives*. Table 9 provides an overview of the distribution of ratings for the rating form items across the 12 cases. The table presents the item numbers, item descriptions, number of valid ratings (i.e., the number of cases completed by all raters, excluding those with missing values or NA ratings), means, and standard deviations (SD).

**Table 9 Descriptive Statistics for Rating Form Items Across Cases** 

Item Number	Item Description	Count	Mean	SD	
Scope					
Item 1.1	Verification of Citizenship and Identity	186	2.00	.97	
Item 1.2	Conduct of Leads	188	2.21	.92	
Item 1.3	Currency of Information	187	2.82	.53	
Item 1.4	References Covered Scope	188	2.77	.54	
Item 1.5	Explanation of Association with Subject	188	2.95	.26	
Item 1.6	Description of Sources and Methods	177	2.92	.37	
Item 1.7	Documentation Provided.	172	2.48	.85	
Issue Resoluti	on				
Item 2.1	Expansion of Leads	165	2.19	.90	
Item 2.2	Verification of Security Relevant	145	2.48	.82	
	Information				
Item 2.3	Resolution of Issues	163	2.22	.90	
Presentation					
Item 3.1	Report Organization	187	2.64	.67	
Item 3.2	Report Clarity and Accuracy	189	2.68	.66	
Item 3.3	Report Legibility	187	2.93	.35	
Item 3.4	Confidential and Protected Sources	52	2.88	.47	
Item 3.5	Investigator Observations Documented	132	2.95	.27	
Utility					
Item 4.1	Completeness of Information	188	1.88	.95	
Item 4.2	Timeliness of Investigation and Report	182	2.67	.73	

Note. Not applicable (NA) ratings were not included in this analysis. Also, some raters were not able to review all 12 investigations. Thus the number of valid ratings (Count) was less than would be expected if every rater reviewed every investigation.

The values of the item means in Table 9 are indicative of the overall quality of the investigations reviewed at the workshop, with a higher value indicating a more satisfactory rating than a lower value. The item means ranged from a low of 1.88 for Item 4.1 (Completeness of Information) to a high of 2.95 for Items 1.5 (Explanation of Association with Subject) and 3.5 (Investigator Observations Documented). Scope Items 1.1 (Verification of Citizenship and Identity) and 1.2 (Conduct of Leads), Issue Resolution items 2.1 (Expansion of Leads) and 2.3 (Resolution of Issues), and Utility Item 4.1 (Completeness of Information) had mean ratings of 2.22 or less across cases. These items also had some of the highest standard deviations, which suggests that there was more variability in the ratings for these items. The highest or most satisfactory mean ratings of 2.88 or above were received for Scope Items 1.5 (Explanation of Association with Subject) and 1.6 (Description of Sources and Methods) and Presentation Items 3.3 (Report Legibility) and 3.4 (Confidential and Protected Sources). These items were among those with the lowest standard deviations, which suggests less variability in the ratings.

*Distribution of Ratings by Item Across Cases*. Figure 1 shows the percentages of the ratings that were Unsatisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, Satisfactory, and Not Applicable across cases. As can be seen in the figure, some items primarily received Satisfactory ratings, while others received a substantial percentage of Unsatisfactory and

Marginally Satisfactory ratings. For example, 80% or more of the ratings were Satisfactory for Scope Items 1.3 (Currency of Information), 1.4 (References Covered Scope), 1.5 (Explanation of Association with Subject), and 1.6 (Description of Sources and Methods); for Presentation Item 3.3 (Report Legibility), and Utility Item 4.2 (Timeliness of Investigation and Report). Items with 40% or more Unsatisfactory ratings included Scope Item 1.1 (Verification of Citizenship and Identity) and Utility Item 4.1 (Completeness of Information). It is notable that several items had relatively high percentages of Not Applicable (NA) ratings. Some NA ratings would be expected due to the characteristics of the cases reviewed at the workshop. For example, not all cases included confidential and other protected sources or investigator observations, so a certain percentage of NA ratings were anticipated for Presentation Items 3.4 and 3.5. However, Issue Resolution Items 2.1 (Expansion of Leads), 2.2 (Verification of Security Relevant Information), and 2.3 (Resolution of Issues) received more NA ratings than expected since most of the cases clearly contained derogatory information or security relevant issues.




Figure 1 Response Distributions for Items Across Cases.

Rater Agreement by Item and Case. One measure of rater agreement is the highest percentage of raters who rated an item the same way for a particular case. In Figure 2, a black circle indicates that 80 to 90% of the raters agreed on their item rating for the case; and a white circle indicates that 60% to 70% of the raters agreed on their rating for the case. For example, there was 80% to 90% agreement on all cases in the ratings of Scope Items 1.5 (Explanation of Association with Subject) and 1.6 (Description of Sources and Methods); in contrast, there was 80% to 90% agreement only

for Case 7 in the ratings of Issue Resolution Item 2.1 (Expansion of Leads) and 2.3 (Resolution of Issues). In general, across all cases, the highest level of agreement was found for Scope Items 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6; for Presentation Item 3.3; and for Utility Item 4.2. The lowest level of agreement was found for Scope Items 1.1 and 1.2; for Resolution Items 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3; for Utility Item 4.1; and the combined Recommendations Item 5.0. The tables in Appendix J show the percent of agreement separately by each rating value for all cases and items.

Case									lte	em								
#	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.3	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	4.1	4.2	5.0
1	0		•	•	•	•	0	0			0	O	O	0		0	•	O
2	O		lacktriangle	0					0					0	0	0		O
3			•	•		•	0				0			0		0		O
4	0		O			•					0	0	•	0	0	0		O
5			•		lacktriangle			0		O	0			0	0	0		
6	O		•	0		•			0		O	0	•	0	0	0		
7		O	O			•						0	•			0		O
8		0				•	0			0			•	0	0		0	O
9		0	•			•		O	0	0			•					
10			•	0		•	0		0		O	0	•					O
11			lacktriangle	O					0					0				O
12	0		•		•	•	0				O	0				•		
All			•	•	•	•	O				O	O	•	O	O		•	

Figure 2 Highest Percent Agreement for Each Item by Case.

Inter-Rater Agreement Statistic. Agreement percentage comparisons, such as those presented in Figure 2 above, are a useful tool to compare agreement across raters and cases. However, such methods are limited in that they do not take into account the fact that a certain percentage of rating agreements will occur merely by chance and, therefore, may produce artificially inflated agreement estimates. To counter this limitation, a more conservative approach to the assessment of inter-rater agreement was employed.

Cohen's kappa, an agreement statistic that corrects for chance, was computed to estimate inter-rater agreement for each of the 18 items on the rating form. This statistic

takes into account agreements, or the number of pairs of raters who selected the same rating (i.e., Unsatisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, Satisfactory, and Not Applicable). It also takes into account the total number of pairs of raters, as well as the number of agreements that would have been expected if raters had assigned ratings at random, with each rating being equally likely. Table 11 shows the *kappa* values and level of agreement for each item.

There are no definite rules for interpreting kappa, but kappa values from .40 to .60 may be considered fair, .60 to .75 good, and greater than .75 excellent (Fleiss, 1981). As seen in Table 10, the item kappas ranged from poor (k = .36) to excellent (k = .92). This finding indicates that some items were rated more reliably than others. Inter-rater agreement was:

- Excellent for Scope Items 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6, and Presentation Item 3.3;
- Good for Scope Item 1.4, Presentation Item 3.2, and Utility Item 4.2;
- Fair for Scope Items 1.1, 1.2, and 1.7; Presentation Items 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5; Utility Item 4.1; and Recommendation Item 5.0;
- Poor for Issue Resolution Items 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.

The *kappa* analysis results supported the percent agreement findings. These initial analyses indicated that there was a higher degree of inter-rater agreement for the items that addressed more specific investigative elements than there was for the items that were more general in nature. For example, there was considerable agreement on Scope Items 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6, which addressed the currency of information, references covered, association with the subject, and sources and methods; on Presentation Items 3.2 and 3.3, which dealt with the clarity, accuracy and legibility of the report; and on Utility Item 4.2, the timeliness of the report. There was much less agreement on the more general Scope Item 1.2, which covered the conduct of all leads; on Issue Resolution Items 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, which described the expansion of leads, verification of information, and resolution of issues; and on Utility Item 4.1, an overall assessment of the adequacy of the report for making adjudicative decisions.

It should be noted that higher levels of inter-rater agreement might be achieved by collapsing ratings. For instance, Marginally Satisfactory and Satisfactory ratings could be combined because both imply adequate performance, even though marginal ratings indicate that there is room for improvement. At this time, it is unclear whether or not raters reliably distinguished these two types of ratings, despite the fact that they are conceptually distinct.

## Table 10 Kappa Values for Items Across Cases

Item	Item Description	kappa	Level of Agreement
Scope			
1.1	Verification of Citizenship and Identity	.52	Fair
1.2	Conduct of Leads	.45	Fair
1.3	Currency of Information	.77	Excellent
1.4	References Covered Scope	.72	Good
1.5	Explanation of Association with Subject	.92	Excellent
1.6	Description of Sources and Methods	.78	Excellent
1.7	Documentation Provided	.51	Fair
Issue R	<b>Resolution</b>		
2.1	Expansion of Leads	.36	Poor
2.2	Verification of Security Relevant Information	.36	Poor
2.3	Resolution of Issues	.39	Poor
Presen	tation		
3.1	Report Organization	.55	Fair
3.2	Report Clarity and Accuracy	.63	Good
3.3	Report Legibility	.88	Excellent
3.4	Confidential and Protected Sources	.57	Fair
3.5	Investigator Observations Documented	.56	Fair
Utility			
4.1	Completeness of Information	.49	Fair
4.2	Timeliness of Investigation and Report	.66	Good
Recom	mendation 5.0	.52	Fair

#### **Rating Frequencies and Percentages**

Tables and graphs that showed the frequency of Unsatisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, and Not Applicable ratings for each case were examined to better understand rating patterns for individual items. The tables are included in Appendix J and the graphs are in Appendix K of this report. The results of this analysis were consistent with the percent agreement and *kappa* analyses described in the previous sections. Ratings for Items 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 4.1 were more variable than the ratings for some of the other items, as can be seen from the charts in Appendix K. There generally was less agreement amongst raters about how to rate performance on these items as evidenced by the higher proportions of different ratings for the same items on the same cases. See Appendix K for an illustration of this analysis and the graphs that were used.

#### **Rater Comments and Discussion Notes**

Rater comments for Unsatisfactory and Marginally Satisfactory ratings as well as discussion notes were reviewed to refine the analysis of inter-rater agreements and disagreements. The comments and discussion notes provided specific information about some of the ratings, as well as general remarks about ways to improve the rating form. First, by reviewing the comments for unsatisfactory and marginal ratings, it was possible to see if what appeared to be a high level of surface agreement in some cases was actually disagreement on another level. For example, there were instances where a large percentage of raters rated performance on a particular item as unsatisfactory, but for different reasons. This was particularly apparent for ratings on Item 1.2 (Conduct of

Leads). Ratings and explanations for Item 1.2, Case 1 are illustrative of this kind of disagreement. Five raters, who rated Item 1.2 as Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory for this case, provided explanations for their ratings as requested. One of the raters cited citizenship verification for the subject's sister. Another rater cited a missing education check. Yet another pointed out deficiencies in employment verification and missing reference interviews. Two of the raters identified the absence of a National Agency Check for the subject's spouse. Furthermore, one of the raters, who cited the missing National Agency Check for the subject's spouse, rated the item as Marginally Satisfactory, while the other rater providing the same explanation rated it as Unsatisfactory. This type of discrepancy may be indicative of a problem with the rating procedures, including the way the question was asked and/or instructions to the raters. It also suggests that raters may have used different underlying criteria when making their ratings.

Second, notes taken during the follow-up discussion at the workshop contained information that supported, expanded upon, or added to findings from other analyses. For example, examination of the rating distributions revealed a relatively high percentage of Not Applicable (NA) ratings for Issue Resolution Items 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. A rating of NA would be expected on these items only if there were no issues identified in a case. However, if an issue were identified, quality ratings would be expected at least on Items 2.2 (Verification of Security Relevant Information) and 2.3 (Resolution of Issues). A quality rating on Item 2.1 (Expansion of Leads) also would be anticipated if there was an indication that the investigation should have been expanded beyond the original scoping requirements. Because most of the workshop cases clearly contained derogatory information, the proportion of NA ratings on these items seemed unreasonably high. In hindsight, the rating procedures should have requested explanations for NA ratings. This was not done, so the discussion notes were reviewed to explain the apparent incongruity.

Analysis of the discussion notes suggested that there was some confusion about interpretation of the Issue Resolution items, especially Items 2.1 and 2.2. Some of the raters reported having difficulty differentiating these items. There also was the suggestion of overlap between Items 2.1 (Expansion of Leads) and 1.2 (Conduct of Leads). Part of this confusion apparently stemmed from different interpretations of the term "leads", which was used in both items. Raters had different understandings of what that term meant, which led to various interpretations of the items that utilized it. The intention was for Item 1.2 to cover the original investigative requirements, and for Item 2.1 to encompass requirements beyond what was originally scoped for a case (e.g., if derogatory information was developed from the original information sources). During the discussion, the experts pointed out that investigators refer to all sources of information as leads, whereas adjudicators may not use this term in the same way. Additionally, the experts said the investigative reports did not always provide enough information to determine whether or not the investigations were expanded appropriately or if information was adequately substantiated. This also may have led some raters to select NA instead of one of the other ratings.

Analysis of rater comments and discussion notes provided valuable information for revising the rating instrument. Raters' explanations for Unsatisfactory and Marginal ratings afforded a better understanding of how adjudicators might interpret the items on the form. Based on this analysis, it was clear that some of the more important items needed to be revised in order to improve inter-rater agreement. In addition, one of the more significant points to come out of the follow-up discussion was that the rating form should document specific problems with investigations, instead of simply noting problems in general areas (e.g., scope). There was some consensus that, if the rating form is going to be used to give feedback to investigation providers or for training, it will have to include the reasons why the investigation was deficient. For example, raters should identify the investigative elements that were inadequate based on the information in the report and the potentially disqualifying issues that were not resolved. Therefore, the experts recommended that the rating form incorporate ways to document specific problems with the investigation.

#### Comparison of Ratings by Type of Organization

One of the questions that arose from the workshop data was whether or not there were differences in ratings by reviewers from different types of organizations. To examine this question, subsequent analyses focused on the overall assessment of the investigation, as reflected by ratings on Item 4.1, Adequacy for Adjudication.

Comparison of Means. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether or not there were significant differences between ratings from representatives of different organizations. The initial ANOVA compared the mean ratings on Item 4.1 for different types of agencies, first between DoD (excluding DIA), IC (DIA, NRO, and CIA), and Other agencies and then between DoD and IC agencies (including DOE). Results of this analysis found that the mean ratings by the DoD and IC agencies were not significantly different, but both the DoD and IC means were significantly lower, that is, less satisfactory, than the mean ratings for the Other agencies (DoD mean 1.80; IC mean 1.73; and Other mean 2.32). There were no significant differences between the mean ratings for DoD and IC agencies (including DOE) (DoD mean 1.80; IC mean 1.83). In both analyses, the standard deviations for the comparison groups were similar, indicating that the variability in ratings by different types of organizations was similar. When these analyses were repeated, collapsing Marginally Satisfactory and Satisfactory ratings, the results were the same, that is, the DoD and IC ratings were similar but were significantly lower than the mean for Other agencies.

Comparison of Response Categories. A second analysis compared the response patterns of the different types of organizations. This analysis compared the percentages of raters in the different types of organizations who responded Unsatisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, and Satisfactory. Results of this analysis found DoD and IC agencies were more likely than Other agencies to rate the investigations as Unsatisfactory, that IC agencies were more likely than either DoD or Other agencies to rate investigations as Marginally Satisfactory, and Other agencies were more likely than DoD or IC to rate investigations as Satisfactory (See Table 11).

Table 11
Adequacy of Investigations by Organization Type (Item 4.1)

	Agency Type							
	DOD		IC		OTHER		ALL	
Rating	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Unsatisfactory	55	57.3	30	54.5	11	29.7	96	51.1
Marginally Satisfactory	5	5.2	10	18.2	3	8.1	18	9.6
Satisfactory	36	37.5	15	27.3	23	62.2	74	39.4
Totals	96	100	55	100	37	100	188	100

When this analysis was repeated, collapsing Marginally Satisfactory and Satisfactory ratings, the results were similar. DoD and IC agencies were significantly more likely than Other agencies to rate the investigations as Marginally Satisfactory/Satisfactory (DoD 42.7%, IC 45.5%, Other 70.3%) and less likely to rate the investigations as Unsatisfactory (DoD 57.3%, IC 54.5%, Other 29.7%).

When the rating responses were compared for DoD and IC (including DOE) agencies, IC agencies were somewhat more likely to rate investigations as Marginally Satisfactory (DoD 5.2%, IC 16.7%) and somewhat less likely to rate investigations as Satisfactory (DoD 37.5%, IC 33.3%) than were DoD agencies (significance level, p. < .051). When the Marginally Satisfactory and Satisfactory ratings were combined, the differences between DoD and IC agencies were in the same direction as the uncollapsed results but were not significant (DoD 57.3% Unsatisfactory, 42.7% Marginal or Satisfactory; IC 50.0% Unsatisfactory, 50.0% Marginal or Satisfactory).

#### **Rating Form Validity**

In the second workshop, experts also provided data that could be used to examine the criterion-related validity of the SSBI-QRF, where validity is defined as the extent to which the form served its intended purpose (i.e., to reflect the quality of investigative reports for supporting adjudicative decisions). Validity coefficients were computed based on correlations between items on the rating form and three criterion variables: independent CAF evaluations, Item 4.1 Completeness, and Item 5.0 Recommendation (see Table 12).

The primary criterion measure was the independent evaluation of each case (as Unsatisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, Satisfactory) by senior adjudicators at the adjudication facilities that provided the cases for the workshop. Secondary criterion measures included Utility Item 4.1, a rating of the extent to which the investigative report provided enough relevant information to allow a clearance eligibility determination to be made, and Recommendation Item 5.0, a dichotomous rating as to whether or not a decision could be made based on the information provided. Although the two secondary

criterion measures were not independent from the other item ratings, these measures are indicative of the overall quality of the investigations.

Table 12
Correlations of SSBI Rating Form Items with Criterion Measures

		Criterion Measures					
		Item 4.1	Item 5.0	CAF			
Item	Item Description	Completeness	Recommendation	Evaluation			
Scope							
	Verification of Citizenship and Identity	.17*	.17*	15*			
Item 1.2	Conduct of Leads	.43**	.44**	.23**			
Item 1.3	Currency of Information	.27**	.15*	.15*			
Item 1.4	References Covered Scope	.07	.04	.15*			
Item 1.5	Explanation of Association with Subject	.07	.10	04			
Item 1.6	Description of Sources and Methods	.01	.01	04			
Item 1.7	Documentation Provided	.33**	.27**	.00			
Issue Re	solution						
Item 2.1	Expansion of Leads	.39**	.35**	.20**			
Item 2.2	Verification of Security Relevant Info.	.26**	.18*	.09			
Item 2.3	Resolution of Issues	.29**	.31**	.19**			
Presenta	tion						
Item 3.1	Report Organization	.15*	.19**	.04			
Item 3.2	Report Clarity and Accuracy	.19**	.19**	.04			
Item 3.3	Report Legibility	.10	.02	07			
Item 3.4	Confidential and Protected Sources	.16	.24	40**			
Item 3.5	Investigator Observations Documented	.05	.05	15			
Utility							
Item 4.2	Timeliness of Investigation and Report	.38**	.22**	.09			
Seconda	ry Criterion Measures						
Item 4.1	Completeness of Information		.66**	.30**			
Item 5.0	Rater Recommendation			.19**			

<sup>\*\*</sup>Level of significance, p <.01; \*Level of significance, p <.05

The information presented in Table 12 supports the contention that some of the items are more valid than others, that is, they are more strongly associated with overall evaluations of the reviewed investigations. Items that were significantly related to two or more of the criterion measures were Scope Items 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.7; Issue Resolution Items 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3; Presentation Items 3.1 and 3.2; and Utility Item 4.2.

Validity Comparisons by Organization Type. Validity coefficients were calculated separately for DoD agencies and IC agencies (NRO, DIA, and CIA) and similar results were found for the DoD agencies as for all agencies. However, for the IC agencies alone, only Scope Items 1.2 and Issue Resolution Items 2.1 and 2.3 were significantly related to two or more of the criterion measures; in addition, Presentation Item 3.4 and Utility Item 4.1 were significantly related to one of the criterion measures. For all agencies and for DoD and IC agencies separately, these findings show that items, which involved more global assessment of the investigative material, were significantly

related to the criterion measures. These global items include Scope Item 1.2 Conduct of Leads; Issue Resolution Item 2.1 Expansion of Leads and 2.3 Resolution of Issues; and Utility Item 4.1 Completeness of Information. Other items that were not significantly related to the criterion measures, despite the fact that they were designed to be content valid and may possess a good deal of inter-rater agreement, may be of questionable utility for assessing the quality of investigations.

These findings suggest that the SSBI-QRF is a reliable and valid assessment instrument for all types of organizations, and that different organizations may use dissimilar criteria for rating investigations. Thus, further research exploring the use of the SSBI-QRF in different agencies has the potential for clarifying the criteria used to determine the quality of investigations. In the long run, this increased understanding could lead to more standardized requirements for investigation providers and increased reciprocity among adjudication agencies.

#### Final Revision of the SSBI-QRF

The SSBI-QRF was revised based on findings from the reliability and validity workshop described in Step 3. (See Appendix L for the latest version of the SSBI-QRF). The goals of this revision were to (1) maintain the most valid and reliable items, (2) to ensure that the basic investigative requirements are covered by the ratings, and (3) to clarify and make more concise the wording of the items.

Key Scope and Issue Resolution items in the previous version of the rating form did not provide a means to rate performance of all E.O. 12968 investigative requirements or the resolution of specific adjudicative issues. The data analysis as well as feedback from experts indicated that a valid SSBI-QRF should include these elements. Also, in order to increase inter-rater reliability, it was necessary to revise the item wording to clarify the intent of items that were confusing in earlier versions of the form. The basic quality dimensions and response options remain the same in the revised version. The resultant SSBI-QRF is a more comprehensive and coherent rating instrument. Nevertheless, the revised form should be field-tested to re-assess its reliability and validity. The specific item changes are discussed in the following sections.

#### **Scope Item Changes**

The Scope dimension was reduced from seven to three items in order to focus on performance in accordance with the investigative elements required by E.O. 12968. Table 13 shows the three items for rating Scope. Item 1.1 now addresses coverage of E.O. 12968 investigative standards. Whether or not these basic requirements were adequately addressed is one of the most fundamental questions in assessing the quality of investigations. Item 1.2 previously covered this in the draft version of the form. Item 1.2 concerns the extent to which unsuccessful efforts to accomplish E.O. 12968 requirements were reported. A new item, Item 1.3 (Inadequate Elements) was added in order to document which elements, if any, were inadequately addressed in the investigative report. This item is conditional, based on the response to Item 1.1 (Investigative

Standards), in that it is only used if Item 1.1 is rated Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory. Items 1.1 (Verification of Citizenship and Identity), 1.4 (References Covered Scope), and 1.5 (Explanation of Association with Subject) from the previous version are covered by the elements of the investigative standards listed in the new Item 1.3. Items 1.3 (Currency of Information) and 1.6 (Description of Sources and Methods) from the earlier form were dropped, and Item 1.7 (Documentation Provided) was moved to Presentation.

# Table 13 Items for Rating Scope

1.1	<b>Investigative Standards</b> . Based on the information in the report of investigation, all investigative elements required by E.O. 12968 were performed.								
1.2	<b>Unsuccessful Attempts</b> . Unsuccessful efforts to accomplish E.O. 12968 investigative requirements were clearly indicated and explained in the report.								
1.3	<b>Inadequate Elements</b> . If you checked Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory in Item 1.1, please indicate below which investigative elements were inadequate based on the information provided in the report. ( <i>Check all that apply.</i> )								
	a. Completion of Security Forms		g. Employment		m. Public Records				
	b. Subject NAC		h. References		n. Subject Interview				
	c. Spouse/Cohabitant NAC		i. Former Spouse		o. Polygraph (if applicable)				
	d. Date and Place of Birth		j. Neighborhoods		p. Expansion of Investigation				
	e. Citizenship		k. Financial Review						
	f. Education		l. Local Agency Checks						

#### **Issue Resolution Item Changes**

Issue Resolution still consists of three items, but they have been reworded. Table 14 displays the revised items for rating Issue Resolution. Item 2.3 (Resolution of Issues) from the previous version of the form was divided into two separate items. Item 2.1 rates the extent to which discrepant, unclear, or illogical information was clarified in the investigation; and Item 2.2 rates the degree to which potentially disqualifying information was resolved based on the information in the investigative report. Item 2.3 asks raters to indicate which specific adjudicative issues were inadequately resolved if Item 2.2 was rated unsatisfactory or marginal. Item 2.1 in the previous version of the form addressed expansion of leads, which is now covered in Item 1.3 under Scope. Item 2.2 from the previous version dealt with verification and corroboration of information, which also is covered by the new items for rating Scope.

# Table 14 Items for Rating Issue Resolution

2.1	<b>Clarification.</b> Discrepant, unclear, or illogical information developed in the investigation was clarified.								
2.2	<b>Resolution</b> . Potentially disqualifying information reported by the subject or developed in the investigation was resolved.								
2.3	Unresolved Issues. If you checked Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory in Item 2.2, please indicate below which E.O. 12968 adjudicative issues were inadequately resolved based on the information provided in the report. (Check all that apply.)								
	A. Allegiance to U.S.		F. Financial Considerations		K. Security Violations				
	B. Foreign Influence		G. Alcohol Consumption		L. Outside Activities				
	C. Foreign Preference		H. Drug Involvement		M. Misuse of Information Technology Systems				
	D. Sexual Behavior		I. Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorder		•				
	E. Personal Conduct		J. Criminal Conduct						

#### **Presentation Item Changes**

The number of Presentation items was decreased from five to three. Table 15 shows the revised items for rating Presentation. Items 3.1 and 3.2 remain the same in the latest version. Item 1.7 (Documentation) from the previous version was moved to this dimension as Item 3.3. Items 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 from the previous form were dropped. Item 3.3 was poorly worded and the ratings were difficult to interpret because it encompassed legibility, appropriateness, and relevance. Items 3.4 and 3.5 were not consistent with the level of abstraction of the other items on the form, and were therefore removed.

# Table 15 Items for Rating Presentation

- 3.1 **Report Organization**. The report was well organized and information was easy to find.
- 3.2 **Clarity and Accuracy**. The report was clearly written, internally consistent, and free of major errors
- 3.3 **Documentation**. All necessary documentation was provided as part of the investigation, including other investigative records and source documents as appropriate.

#### **Utility Item Changes**

The Utility dimension was not changed. This dimension still consists of two items. Item 4.1 is an overall evaluation of product utility for making adjudicative decisions. Item 4.2 concerns timeliness, which also can be considered an aspect of investigation utility. Table 16 displays the items for rating this dimension.

## Table 16 Items for Rating Utility

- 4.1 **Adequacy for Adjudication**. The investigative report provided enough relevant information to allow a clearance eligibility determination to be made.
- 4.2 **Timeliness of Investigation**. The investigation was completed and the report submitted in a timely manner.

#### **Rating Scale**

The rating scale remained the same as in the draft form. It includes a four-point scale to rate the performance of each item as Unsatisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, Satisfactory, or Not Applicable (NA).

#### **SSBI Quality Explanation Form**

An optional explanation form, the SSBI Quality Explanation Form (SSBI-QEF), was designed to record a brief explanation for all items on the SSBI-QRF that are rated *Unsatisfactory* or *Marginally Satisfactory*. Explanations should (1) identify the item number; (2) provide the rating; and (3) describe which elements of the investigation were deficient and why. This form was included so that the rating system could be used to provide specific feedback to investigation providers about product deficiencies (see Appendix M).

#### Instructions for Completing the SSBI-QRF and SSBI-QEF

A document was developed to provide detailed instructions for completing the SSBI-QRF and the optional SSBI-QEF. It describes the content and format of each form, as well as instructions for recording ratings and explanations of ratings (see Appendix N).

#### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This project developed the SSBI Quality Rating Form (SSBI-QRF) that can be used to evaluate the quality of SSBIs from different providers. The SSBI-QRF went through a series of revisions during the research and development process. Early versions of the form were based on interviews with personnel security experts from various government agencies, as well as a review of relevant documents and manuals. This material was analyzed and then synthesized to produce an initial rating form that included nine basic elements of investigation quality (i.e., Identity, Coverage, Expansion, Resolution, Substantiation, Documentation, Presentation, Whole Person, and Utility), as well as 27 items that further defined the basic elements.

Two workshops were convened to evaluate the instrument. At the first workshop, 23 senior adjudicators and investigations personnel from 16 government agencies reviewed and determined the content validity of the initial rating form. The workshop resulted in a revised form, containing four basic elements (i.e., Scope, Issue Resolution,

Presentation, and Utility) characterized by 17 items. This revised rating form was considered by the experts to be content valid, in that it was comprehensive, general in its content, and covered all of the important aspects of investigation quality.

A second workshop was held to assess the inter-rater reliability and criterion-related validity of the items on the rating form. At this workshop, 19 senior adjudicators from 10 government agencies used the revised form to rate actual investigations. They also provided feedback and recommendations concerning the form and its implementation. The results of the workshop indicated that there was a higher degree of inter-rater agreement for items that addressed more specific investigative elements than there was for the more general items. However, items that involved a comparatively global assessment of the investigation were more likely to be significantly related to the adjudication facilities' independent assessment of investigation quality, and to the workshop participants' evaluation of utility as well as their recommended decisions. Given these findings, the rating form was subsequently revised to improve item reliability and validity.

Any time substantial changes are made to the rating form, it should be tested to estimate its reliability and validity. The current version of the SSBI-QRF will require additional testing, given the significant changes that were made after the last workshop. This could be accomplished by bringing together a group of experts from across the community to rate a set of investigations or by using the form within specific agencies to assess the quality of investigation products from their providers. Ideally, any field-test would include investigations from several different providers.

While the national investigative standards are specific, their application in complex investigations is less clear. This makes evaluation of investigations difficult because of the problems described by Stewart (2001) concerning the reliability of judgments between two observers of the same events. If an investigative report is considered to be a set of facts, reviewers may concentrate on and extract different sets of facts. Additionally, they may interpret extracted facts differently. This ensures that rating judgments will rarely be perfectly reliable and expertise does not appear to completely mitigate the problem (Stewart, 2001).

The research literature indicates that rating unreliability can be constrained somewhat by using analytical procedures. Analytical procedures create an overt, step-by-step defensible decision-making process, which, if documented, allows for a review of the investigation product. Given these findings, the goal of the SSBI-QRF is to make the process of evaluating investigations more analytical. It does this by requiring raters to clearly document specific elements of the investigative standards that were inadequately performed and specific adjudicative guidelines that they judged to be marginally or unsatisfactorily resolved. While there will never be perfect reliability or consistency in the rating form, it is possible for reviewers to determine if all of the investigative elements in the case were covered and the adjudicative issues adequately resolved.

The SSBI-QRF was developed so that it can be used for different purposes. It has potential applications in several areas. Supervisors and instructors could use the form to provide performance feedback to investigators as part of professional development and training. Contract monitors and adjudicators may be able to use it to help monitor contract performance and give feedback to investigation providers. Independent evaluators may be able to use the form periodically to rate investigation quality as part of agency oversight and to assess cost-effectiveness. Also, the rating process may need to be modified to meet the needs of different users. For example, the optional rating explanation form can be included if detailed information is necessary. This would be necessary if the form were used to give personal feedback to investigators about their performance. On the other hand, if the form were used to collect data as part of agency oversight, ratings without explanations might be sufficient. A similar argument can be made for inclusion or omission of the Marginally Satisfactory rating option, depending on the purpose of the ratings.

The SSBI-QRF has some notable limitations. It was designed to assess the quality of investigations based on the information in investigative reports. It was not designed to rate the quality of the fieldwork upon which investigative reports are based. Therefore, evaluations of investigation quality using this form are limited to what can be inferred from the information provided in investigative reports. This may leave many questions about the quality of investigations unanswered. The only way to address some of these questions is to conduct observations, or ride-alongs, with investigators in the field. The SSBI-QRF is, nevertheless, a useful instrument because it can be used to assess the quality of the investigative product used by adjudicators for making access eligibility determinations.

With increasing numbers of contract investigation providers and evidence of adjudicator dissatisfaction with investigations, it is incumbent on government agencies to systematically monitor and document the quality of their investigation products. Not only will this enhance government efficiency, but also it will help fulfill the government's obligation to provide reasonable protection of classified information in a time of increased threats to national security. Development of a quality assessment tool that can be used by security personnel from different agencies is an important preliminary step to achieving these goals. The SSBI-QRF was designed to meet this need. The current form is believed to contain the basic elements necessary to assess SSBI quality at a level of detail that would maximize the value of the information gathered while minimizing the burden on available resources if implemented.

#### Recommendations

Recommendations for the continued development and use of the SSBI-QRF are summarized below.

- Field-test the latest version of the SSBI-QRF to re-evaluate its reliability and validity. Experts from different agencies and investigation providers should carry out this effort jointly.
- Develop explicit rating criteria and standards. More explicit definitions for the ratings associated with each item would help clarify their basis, especially if the form is used by different agencies.
- Assess the utility of using scores to indicate the quality of investigative reports along each dimension as well as overall performance. Assigning values to ratings would facilitate evaluation and reporting of findings if the form is used to rate large numbers of investigations.
- Once the SSBI-QRF is fully validated, use it to periodically assess the overall
  quality of investigations being conducted by different providers for the federal
  government. This feedback could be used to improve investigator training and
  to enhance communication between adjudicators and providers.
- Use the data and findings from rating form research and development to help build consensus within the national security community about how investigations should be conducted and reported. This could lead to standardized Statements of Work for investigation providers, investigation reporting formats, and systematic approaches to monitoring contracts and reviewing investigation products.

#### References

- Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Access to Classified Information (Approved by the President in 1997) [Electronic Version]. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.fas.org/sgp/spb/class.html">http://www.fas.org/sgp/spb/class.html</a>
- Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/4 (Annex A). Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information [Electronic Version]. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid6-4/class.html
- Executive Order 12968, "Access to Classified Information," August 2, 1995.
- Fleiss, J.L. (1981). *Statistical methods for rates and proportions*. Cited in Bakeman, R. & Gottman, J.M. (1986). *Observing interaction: An introduction to sequential analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified
  Information (Approved by the President in 1997) [Electronic Version]. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.fas.org/spb/bginvest.html">http://www.fas.org/spb/bginvest.html</a>
- Stewart, T.R. (2001). Improving reliability of judgmental forecasts. In J. Scott Armstrong (Ed.), *Principles of forecasting: A handbook for researchers and practitioners*. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- The Privacy Act (1974). 5 U.S.C., Section 552a [Electronic Version]. Retrieved from http://www.usdoj.gov/foia/privstat.htm

### Appendix A

**Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information** 

# **Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information**

- 1. **Introduction.** The following investigative standards are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information, to include Sensitive Compartmented Information and Special Access Programs, and are to be used by government departments and agencies as the investigative basis for final clearance determinations. However, nothing in these standards prohibits an agency from using any lawful investigative procedures in addition to these requirements in order to resolve any issue identified in the course of a background investigation or reinvestigation.
- 2. **The Three Standards.** There are three standards (Table 1 in the Appendix summarizes when to use each one): (a) The investigation and reinvestigation standards for "L" access authorizations and for access to CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET (including all SECRET-level Special Access Programs not specifically approved for enhanced investigative requirements by an official authorized to establish Special Access Programs by sect. 4.4 of Executive Order 12958);
- (b) The investigation standard for "Q" access authorizations and for access to TOP SECRET (including Top SECRET Special Access Programs) and Sensitive Compartmented Information; and
- (c) The reinvestigation standard for continued access to the levels listed in para. 2(b).
- 3. **Exception to Periods of Coverage.** Some elements of standards specify a period of coverage (eg., seven years). Where appropriate, such coverage may be shortened to the period from the subject's eighteenth birthday to the present or to two years, whichever is longer.
- 4. **Expanding Investigations.** Investigations and reinvestigations may be expanded under the provisions of Executive Order 12968 and other applicable statutes and Executive Orders.
- 5. **Transferability.** Investigations that satisfy the requirements of a given standard and are current meet the investigative requirements for all levels specified for the standard. They shall be mutually and reciprocally accepted by all agencies.
- 6. **Breaks in Service.** If a person who requires access has been retired or separated from US government employment for less than two years and is the subject of an investigation that is otherwise current, the agency regranting the access will, as a minimum, review an updated Standard Form 86 and applicable records. A reinvestigation is not required unless the review indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive Order 12968 (see Table 2).
- 7. **The National Agency Check.** The National Agency Check is a part of all investigations and reinvestigations. It consists of a review of (a) investigative and criminal history files of the FBI, including a technical fingerprint search;
- (b) OPM's Security/Suitability Investigations Index;
- (c) DoD's Defense Clearance and Investigations Index; and
- (d) such other national agencies (e.g., CIA, INS) as appropriate to the individual's background.

#### STANDARD A

#### National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit Check (NACLC)

8. **Applicability.** Standard A applies to investigations and reinvestigations for (a) access to CONFIDENTAL and SECRET (including all SECRET-level Special Access Programs not specifically approved for enhanced investigative requirements by an official authorized to establish Special Access Programs by sect. 4.4 of Executive Order 12958), and (b) "L" access authorizations.

- 9. **For Reinvestigations: When to Reinvestigate.** The reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion of, but not later than ten years (fifteen years for CONFIDENTIAL) from the date of, the previous investigation or reinvestigation. (Table 2 reflects the specific requirements for when to request a reinvestigation, including when there has been a break in service.)
- 10. **Investigative Requirements.** Investigative requirements are as follows: (a) **Completion of Forms:** Completion of Standard Form 86, including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
- (b) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency Check.
- (c) **Financial Review:** Verification of the subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where the subject has resided, been employed, or attended school for six months or more for the past seven years.
- (d) **Date and Place of Birth:** Corroboration of date and place of birth through a check of appropriate documentation, if not completed in any previous investigation; a check of Bureau of Vital Statistics records when any discrepancy is found to exist.
- (e) **Local Agency Checks:** As a minimum, all investigations will include checks of law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction where the subject has lived, worked, and/or attended school within the last five years, and, if applicable, of the appropriate agency for any identified arrests within the last five years.
- 11. **Expanding for Issues.** The investigation may be expanded if necessary to determine if access is clearly consistent with the national security.

#### STANDARD B

#### **Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI)**

- 12. **Applicability.** Standard B applies to initial investigations for (a) access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET Special Access Programs) and Sensitive Compartmented Information; and (b) "Q" access authorizations.
- 13. **Investigative Requirements.** Investigative requirements are as follows:
- (a) **Completion of Forms:** Completion of standard Form 86, including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
- (b) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency Check.
- (c) National Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant (if applicable): Completion of a National Agency Check, without fingerprint cards, for the spouse or cohabitant.
- (d) **Date and Place of Birth:** Corroboration of date and place of birth through a check of appropriate documentation; a check of Bureau of Vital Statistics records when any discrepancy is found to exist.
- (e) **Citizenship:** For individuals born outside the United States, verification of US citizenship directly from the appropriate registration authority; verification of US citizenship or legal status of foreign-born immediate family members (spouse, cohabitant, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters).
- (f) **Education:** Corroboration of most recent or most significant claimed attendance, degree, or diploma. Interviews of appropriate educational sources if education is a primary activity of the subject during the most recent three years.
- (g) **Employment.** Verification of all employments for the past seven years, personal interviews of sources (supervisors, coworkers, or both) for each employment of six months or more; corroboration through records or sources of all periods of unemployment exceeding sixty days; verification of all prior federal and military service, including discharge type. For military members, all service within one branch of the armed forces wifl be considered as on employment, regardless of assignments.
- (h) **References:** Four references, of whom at least two are developed; to the extent practicable, all should have social knowledge of the subject and collectively span at least the last seven years.
- (i) Former Spouse: An interview of any former spouse divorced within the last ten years.
- (j) **Neighborhoods:** Confirmation of all residences for the last three years through appropriate interviews with neighbors and through records reviews.

- (k) **Financial Review:** Verification of the subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more for the last seven years.
- (1) **Local Agency Checks:** A check of appropriate criminal history records covering all locations where, for the last ten years, the subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more, including current residence regardless of duration. (NOTE: If no residence, employment, or education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be performed as deemed appropriate.)
- (m) **Public Records:** Verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the subject.
- (n) **Subject Interview:** A subject interview, conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. During the investigation, additional subject interviews may be conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations may be taken whenever appropriate.
- (o) **Polygraph (only in agencies with approved personnel security polygraph programs):** In departments or agencies with policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security purposes, the investigation may include a polygraph examination, conducted by a qualified polygraph examiner.
- 14. **Expanding the Investigation.** 'I'he investigation may be expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may be conducted.

#### STANDARD C

#### Single-Scope Background Investigation -- Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR)

- 15. **Applicability.** Standard C applies to reinvestigations for (a) access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET Special Access Programs) and Sensitive Compartmented Information; and (b) "Q" access authorizations.
- 16. When to Reinvestigate. The reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion of, but not later than five years from the date of, the previous investigation (see Table 2).
- 17. **Reinvestigative Requirements.** Reinvestigative requirements are as follows: (a) **Completion of Forms:** Completion of Standard Form 86, including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
- (b) **National Agency Check:** Completion of a National Agency Check (fingerprint cards are required only if there has not been a previous valid technical check of the FBI).
- (c) National Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant (if applicable): Completion of a National Agency Check, without fingerprint cards, for the spouse or cohabitant. The National Agency Check for the spouse or cohabitant is not required if already completed in conjunction with a previous investigation or reinvestigation.
- (d) **Employment:** Verification of all employments since the. last investigation. Attempts to interview a sufficient number of sources (supervisors, coworkers, or both) at all employments of six months or more. For military members, all service within one branch of the armed forces will be considered as one employment, regardless of assignments.
- (e) **References:** Interviews with two character references who are knowledgeable of the subject; at least one will be a developed reference. To the extent practical, both should have social knowledge of the subject and collectively span the entire period of the reinvestigation. As appropriate, additional interviews may be conducted, including with cohabitants and relatives.
- (f) **Neighborhoods:** Interviews of two neighbors in the vicinity of the subject's most recent residence of six months or more. Confirmation of current residence regardless of length.
- (g) **Financial Review:** (1) **Financial Status:** Verification of the subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more for the period covered by the reinvestigation;
- (2) **Check of Treasury's Financial Data Base:** Agencies may request the Department of the Treasury, under terms and conditions prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, to search automated data bases consisting of reports of currency transactions by financial institutions, international transportation of currency or monetary instruments,

foreign bank and financial accounts, and transactions under \$10,000 that are reported as possible money laundering violations.

- (h) **Local Agency Checks:** A check of appropriate criminal history records covering all locations where, during the period covered by the reinvestigation, the subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more, including current residence regardless of duration. (NOTE: If no residence, employment or education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be performed as deemed appropriate.)
- (i) **Former Spouse.** An interview with any former spouse unless the divorce took place before the date of the last investigation or reinvestigation.
- (j) **Public Records:** Verification of divorces, bankruptcies and other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the subject since the date of the last investigation.
- (k) **Subject Interview:** A subject interview, conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. During the reinvestigation, additional subject interviews may be conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations may be taken whenever appropriate.
- 18. **Expanding the Reinvestigation.** The reinvestigation may be expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may be conducted.

### Appendix B

Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information

# ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

#### Approved by the President March 24, 1997

- 1. *Introduction*. The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all U.S. government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information and special access programs, and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations
- 2. The Adjudicative Process. (a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudication process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:
  - (1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
  - (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
  - (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct;
  - (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
  - (5) the voluntariness of participation;
  - (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes;
  - (7) the motivation for the conduct;
  - (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
  - (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
- (b) Each case must be judged on its own merits and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.
- (c) The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person, as explained further below:
  - (1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to the United States;
  - (2) GUIDELINE B: Foreign influence;
  - (3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign preference;
  - (4) GUIDELINE D: Sexual behavior;
  - (5) GUIDELINE E: Personal conduct;

- (6) GUIDELINE F: Financial considerations:
- (7) GUIDELINE G: Alcohol consumption;
- (8) GUIDELINE H: Drug involvement;
- (9) GUIDELINEI: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders;
- (10) GUIDELINE J: Criminal conduct;
- (11) GUIDELINE K: Security violations;
- (12) GUIDELINE L: Outside activities;
- (13) GUIDELINE M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems
- (d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding the whole person concept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.
- (e) When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:
  - (1) voluntarily reported the information;
  - (2) was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
  - (3) sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;
  - (4) resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern:
  - (5) has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
  - (6) should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.
- (f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may resort ln revocation of access.

#### **GUIDELINE A: ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES**

- 3. *The Concern*. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.
- 4. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means;
- (b) association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
- (c) association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;

- (d) involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
- 5. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) the individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these:
- (b) the individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
- (c) involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
- (d) the person has had no recent involvement or association with such activities.

#### **GUIDELINE B: FOREIGN INFLUENCE**

- 6. *The Concern*. A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
- 7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;
- (b) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists;
- (c) relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government;
- (d) failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;
- (e) unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
- (f) conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
- (g) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;
- (h) a substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.
- 8. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States:
- (b) contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official U.S. Government business;

- (c) contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent;
- (d) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country;
- (e) foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.

#### **GUIDELINE C: FOREIGN PREFERENCE**

- 9. *The Concern*. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
- 10. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) the exercise of dual citizenship;
- (b) possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
- (c) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
- (d) accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
- (e) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
- (f) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;
- (g) seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
- (h) voting in foreign elections; and
- (i) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government
- in preference to the interests of the United States
- 11. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country;
- (b) indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining united States citizenship;
- (c) activity is sanctioned by the United States;
- (d) individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.

#### **GUIDELINE D: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR**

12. *The Concern*. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, may subject the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. Sexual orientation or preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.

- <sup>1</sup> The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining to criminal conduct (Guideline J) and emotional, mental, and personality disorders (Guideline I) in determining how to resolve the security concerns raised by sexual behavior.
- 13. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;
- (b) compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is unable to stop a pattern of self-destructive or high-risk behavior or that which is symptomatic of a personality disorder;
- (c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
- (d) sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects lack of discretion or judgment.
- 4. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
- (b) the behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
- (c) there is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotional instability;
- (d) the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.

#### **GUIDELINE E: PERSONAL CONDUCT**

- 15. *The Concern*. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:
- (a) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing, or
- (b) refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
- 16. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying also include:
- (a) reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;
- (b) the deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
- (c) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official representative in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination;

- (d) personal conduct or concealment of information that increases an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation or duress, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail;
- (e) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency;
- (f) association with persons involved in criminal activity.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- (a) The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
- (b) the falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily;
- (c) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts;
- (d) omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided;
- (e) the individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
- (f) a refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;
- (g) association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.

#### **GUIDELINE F: FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS**

- 18. *The Concern.* An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
- 19. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) A history of not meeting financial obligations;
- (b) deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;
- (c) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
- (d) unexplained affluence;
- (e) financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
- 20. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) the behavior was not recent;
- (b) it was an isolated incident;

- (c) the conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation);
- (d) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;
- (e) the affluence resulted from a legal source; and
- (f) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.

#### **GUIDELINE G: ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION**

- 21. *The Concern*. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.
- 22. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
- (b) alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job;
- (c) diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;
- (d) evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;
- (e) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment;
- (f) consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program
- 23. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;
- (b) the problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no indication of a recent problem;
- (c) positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
- (d) following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participated frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12 months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.

#### **GUIDELINE H: DRUG INVOLVEMENT**

#### 24. The Concern.

(a) Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information

- (b) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include: (1) drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and (2) inhalants and other similar substances.
- (c) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
- 25. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) Any drug abuse (see above definition);
- (b) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;
- (c) diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;
- (d) evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program;
- (e) failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance, or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably result in an unfavorable determination.
- 26. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) the drug involvement was not recent;
- (b) the drug involvement was an isolated or infrequent event;
- (c) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;
- (d) satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional.

#### GUIDELINE I: EMOTIONAL, MENTAL, AND PERSONALITY DISORDERS

- 27. *The Concern.* Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability or stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to or approved by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care provider.
- 28. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;
- (b) information that suggests that an individual has failed to follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, e.g. failure to take prescribed medication;
- (c) a pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social or emotionally unstable behavior;

- (d) information that suggests that the individual's current behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.
- 29. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) There is no indication of a current problem;
- (b) recent diagnosis by a credentialed mental health professional that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is cured, under control or in remission and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
- (c) the past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.

#### **GUIDELINE J: CRIMINAL CONDUCT**

- 30. *The Concern*. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
- 31. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged;
- (b) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
- 32. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) the criminal behavior was not recent;
- (b) the crime was an isolated incident;
- (c) the person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;
- (d) the person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;
- (e) acquittal;
- (f) there is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.

#### **GUIDELINE K: SECURITY VIOLATIONS**

- 33. *The Concern.* Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.
- 34. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
- (b) violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.
- 35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions that:
- (a) were inadvertent;
- (b) were isolated or infrequent;

- (c) were due to improper or inadequate training;
- (d) demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security responsibilities.

#### **GUIDELINE L: OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES**

- 36. *The Concern*. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
- 37. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying~ include: any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with:
- (a) a foreign country;
- (b) any foreign national;
- (c) a representative of any foreign interest;
- (d) any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
- 38. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;
- (b) the individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.

#### GUIDELINE M: MISUSE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS

- 39. *The Concern*. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.
- 40. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (a) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system;
- (b) illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or denial of access to information residing on an information technology system;
- (c) removal (or use) of hardware, software, or media from any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
- (d) introduction of hardware, software, or media into any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.
- 41. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (a) The misuse was not recent or significant;

- (b) the conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
- (c) the introduction or removal of media was authorized;
- (d) the misuse was an isolated event;
- (e) the misuse was followed by a prompt, good faith effort to correct the situation.

## **Appendix C**

Initial Draft Dimensions and Items for Rating the Quality of Single Scope Background Investigations

## **Initial Draft Dimensions and Items for Rating SSBI Quality**

#### 1.0 Identity

#### **Identity**

1.1 The investigation established the identity of the Subject (e.g., by verifying Subject identifiers).

#### 2.0 Coverage

- 2.1 All required sources were covered during the investigation.
- 2.2 Unsuccessful efforts to accomplish leads were clearly indicated and explained in the report.
- 2.3 Prior investigations were obtained and reported, as appropriate.
- 2.4 The subject interview addressed all discrepancies, omissions, and areas of security concern.
- 2.5 The report accurately represented all information obtained from records or record custodians.
- 2.6 Each reference entry accurately explained the nature, dates, and frequency of the reference's association with the Subject.
- 2.7 Determined from appropriate personal sources interviewed if they would recommend the Subject for a position involving the national security, or if they have any reason not to recommend the Subject.
- 2.8 The report explained all unsuccessful attempts to obtain personal or record coverage, where such coverage was expected.
- 2.9 The report reflected any testimony, personal or record, obtained over the telephone and why the testimony was not obtained in person.

#### 3.0 Issue Resolution

- 3.1 The investigation was expanded to cover any developed information of security concern.
- 3.2 During the investigation, additional subject interviews were conducted as required, to collect relevant information, to resolve significant inconsistencies, or both.
- 3.3 If a record review developed significant adverse information, an Investigator interviewed or attempted to interview personal sources even if the investigative scope did not require personal sources at the activity.

#### 4.0 Resolution

- 4.1 All discrepant, unclear, illogical, and potentially disqualifying information developed in the investigation was resolved in the report.
- 4.2 The information in the security form and supporting documents was complete and all discrepancies were resolved.
- 4.3 All discrepant, unfavorable, and derogatory information found in records was reported in full and attributed to its source.
- 4.4 If the investigation developed information about any conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying under the Adjudicative Guidelines, the report provided enough additional information to determine...
  - 4.4.1 the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
  - 4.4.2 the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
  - 4.4.3 the frequency and recency of the conduct;
  - 4.4.4 the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
  - 4.4.5 the voluntariness of participation;
  - 4.4.6 the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes:
  - 4.4.7 the motivation for the conduct;
  - 4.4.8 the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress;
  - 4.4.9 the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

#### 5.0 Substantiation

5.1 Obtained or attempted to obtain corroborating sources for all issue, discrepant and mitigating information.

#### **6.0 Documentation**

- 6.1 All necessary documentation was obtained as part of the investigation.
- 6.2 Documents provided in support of reported testimony or provided as a substitute for reported record information were attached to the report. Attachments were clearly referenced in the report.
- 6.3 All documents contained in the investigative report pertained to the Subject.

#### 7.0 Presentation

- 7.1 The report was well organized and information was easy to find.
- 7.2 Writing was clear, concise, and free of major errors.
- 7.3 There was an appropriate amount of detail in the report.

#### 8.0 Whole Person

8.1 The report presented information in a way that provided a meaningful picture of the Subject.

#### 9.0 Utility

- 9.1 The report provided enough relevant information to allow an eligibility determination to be made with confidence.
- 9.2 The overall usefulness of the report was good.

# Appendix D

**Content Validity Workshop Participants** 

## **Content Validity Workshop Participants**

Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals
Defense Security Service
Department of Energy
Department of State
Department of the Air Force
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
National Reconnaissance Office
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Personnel Management
Washington Headquarters Service

# Appendix E

**Content Validity Workshop Agenda** 

## SSBI Quality Rating Form Content Validity Workshop Agenda

	Time	
Day 1	0830 - 0900	Introductions & Overview of Research Program
	0900 - 0915	Overview of Meeting Goals and Agenda.
	0915 - 1030	Dimensions of Investigation Quality
		Overview of development of draft dimensions
		Large group discussion to revise/edit dimensions and their
		definitions
	1030 - 1045	Break
	1045 - 1200	Items to be Rated within Dimensions
		Small group review of selected dimensions
		Small group identification of items to be rated within each
		dimension
	1200 - 1300	Lunch
	1300 - 1400	Continue Small Group Identification of Items to be Rated
	1400 - 1500	Large Group Feedback on Rating Items for Each Dimension
		Small group presentation of rating items by dimension
		Large group feedback on rating items
	1500 – 1515	Break
	1515 – 1600	Continue Large Group Feedback on Rating Items

Day 2	0830 - 0900	Dimension Item Rating Criteria
		• Goals and objectives for Day 2
		Description of rating criteria and their usage
	0900 - 1015	Identify rating criteria for each item with each dimension
		Large group review of example rating criteria
		Small group review of items within selected dimensions
		Small group identification of rating criteria for each item
	1015 - 1030	Break
	1030 – 1200	Continue Small Group Identification of Rating Criteria
	1200 – 1300	Lunch
	1300 – 1430	Feedback on Rating Criteria for Items Within Each Dimension
		Small group presentation of rating criteria for each item
		Large group feedback/editing of rating criteria
	1430 – 1445	Break
	1445 – 1545	Continue Large Group Feedback on Rating Criteria
	1545 – 1600	Conclusion
		Next steps in development of rating instrument
		Participant feedback on workshop

# Appendix F

**Draft SSBI Quality Rating Form** 

RATER CODE:	CASE CODE:

# SINGLE SCOPE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION QUALITY RATING FORM

Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Å.

Rating Instructions: Check one box to indicate how below is addressed and presented in the investigation Marginally Satisfactory, or Satisfactory? Check NA in	Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	AN							
5.0 Recommended Adjudicative Decision (Check one)											
5.1 Recommend Approval		5.3. Recommend Conditional Approval	With V	Varning	J						
5.2 Recommend Disapproval 5.4 Recommend No Decision; Return to Provider											

## Appendix G

**Explanation Form for Marginal and Unsatisfactory Ratings** 

RATER CODE:	

## **EXPLANATION OF SSBI MARGINAL AND UNSATISFACTORY RATINGS**

**Instructions:** For any item rated marginal or unsatisfactory, please provide the case number and item number. Then, check your item rating (i.e., MAR for marginal or UNSAT for unsatisfactory). Provide an explanation of your rating and, if appropriate, enter relevant case page number(s).

Case #	Item #	Rating (Check one)		Explanation of Your Rating. As appropriate, please provide the relevant case page number(s).
	MAR UNSAT		UNSAT	

# Appendix H

**Inter-Rater Reliability Workshop Participants** 

## **Inter-Rater Reliability Workshop Participants**

Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals
Department of Energy
Department of the Air Force
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Internal Revenue Service
National Reconnaissance Office
Washington Headquarters Service

## Appendix I

SSBI Quality Rating Form Inter-Rater Reliability Workshop Agenda

# Agenda Single Scope Background Investigation Quality Rating Form Inter-Rater Reliability Workshop February 25 – 26, 2003

	Time	Activity
Day 1	0830 - 0845	Introduction
-	0845 - 0900	Project History
	0900 – 0915	Review Rating Form
	0915 - 0930	Explain Case Review and Rating Procedures
	0930 - 0945	Break
	0945 - 1200	Rate Investigations (Break as necessary)
	1200 – 1300	Lunch
	1300 - 1430	Rate Investigations
	1430 – 1445	Break
	1445 – 1600	Rate Investigations
Day 2	0830 - 0930	Present Rater Agreement Data
	0930 - 1000	Discuss Case Rating Inconsistencies
	1000 – 1015	Break
	1015 - 1200	Discuss Item Rating Inconsistencies
	1200 - 1300	Lunch
	1300 – 1430	Discuss Ways to Improve Form
	1430 – 1445	Break
	1445 – 1600	Discuss Implementation Strategies and Closing

# Appendix J

**Item Rating Distribution Tables** 

Table J.1
Frequency and Percent of Raters by Item across All Cases

Item	Unsati	sfactory		ginally Factory	Satisf	factory	Not Ap	plicable	All R	atings
	Count	<b>Percent</b>	Count	<b>Percent</b>	Count	<b>Percent</b>	Count	<b>Percent</b>	Count	Percent
1.1	87	46.0	12	6.3	87	46.0	3	1.6	189	100.0
1.2	64	34.0	21	11.2	103	54.8	0	0.0	188	100.0
1.3	12	6.3	10	5.3	165	87.3	2	1.1	189	100.0
1.4	11	5.8	21	11.1	156	82.5	1	0.5	189	100.0
1.5	2	1.1	5	2.6	181	95.8	1	0.5	189	100.0
1.6	5	2.6	5	2.6	167	88.4	12	6.3	189	100.0
1.7	40	21.2	9	4.8	123	65.1	17	9.0	189	100.0
2.1	54	28.9	26	13.9	86	46.0	21	11.2	187	100.0
2.2	30	16.1	16	8.6	100	53.8	40	21.5	186	100.0
2.3	51	27.1	25	13.3	88	46.8	24	12.8	188	100.0
3.1	21	11.2	28	15.0	138	73.8	0	0.0	187	100.0
3.2	21	11.1	20	10.6	148	78.3	0	0.0	189	100.0
3.3	6	3.2	4	2.1	177	94.1	1	0.5	188	100.0
3.4	4	2.1	0	0.0	48	25.4	137	72.5	189	100.0
3.5	3	1.6	2	1.1	127	67.2	57	30.2	189	100.0
4.1	97	51.6	18	9.6	73	38.8	0	0.0	188	100.0
4.2	29	15.7	4	2.2	149	80.5	3	1.6	185	100.0
				Condi	Conditionally		No Decision;			
	Арр	orove	Disap	prove		orove	Re	turn		
5.0	68	37.8%	6	3.3%	6	3.3%	100	55.6%	180	100.0

Table J.2 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 1.1

Case	Unsatisfactory		Marginally Satisfactory		Satisfactory		Not Applicable		All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	2	14.3	2	14.3	2	14.3	0	0.0	14	100.0
2	4	23.5	2	11.8	2	11.8	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	14	82.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	4	22.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	18	100.0
5	10	55.6	3	16.7	3	16.7	0	0.0	18	100.0
6	11	61.1	1	5.6	1	5.6	3	16.7	18	100.0
7	2	11.8	1	5.9	1	5.9	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	10	58.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
9	13	81.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	16	100.0
10	8	53.3	1	6.7	1	6.7	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	1	9.1	1	9.1	1	9.1	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	8	72.7	1	9.1	1	9.1	0	0.0	11	100.0
All	87	46.0	12	6.3	12	6.3	3	1.6	189	100.0

Table J.3
Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 1.2

Case	Unsatisfactory		Marginally Satisfactory		Satisfactory		Not Applicable		All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	2	15.4	4	30.8	7	53.8	0	0.0	13	100.0
2	3	17.6	4	23.5	10	58.8	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	6	35.3	1	5.9	10	58.8	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	10	55.6	0	0.0	8	44.4	0	0.0	18	100.0
5	1	5.6	1	5.6	16	88.9	0	0.0	18	100.0
6	9	50.0	2	11.1	7	38.9	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	4	23.5	2	11.8	11	64.7	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	12	70.6	2	11.8	3	17.6	0	0.0	17	100.0
9	4	25.0	1	6.3	11	68.8	0	0.0	16	100.0
10	5	33.3	1	6.7	9	60.0	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	2	18.2	3	27.3	6	54.5	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	6	54.5	0	0.0	5	45.5	0	0.0	11	100.0
All Cases	64	34.0	21	11.2	103	54.8	0	0.0	188	100.0

Table J.4
Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 1.3

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally factory	Satisfactory		Not Ap	plicable	All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	1	7.1	0	0.0	13	92.9	0	0.0	14	100.0
2	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	4	22.2	1	5.6	13	72.2	0	0.0	18	100.0
5	0	0.0	3	16.7	15	83.3	0	0.0	18	100.0
6	0	0.0	1	5.6	17	94.4	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	4	23.5	1	5.9	12	70.6	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	3	17.6	2	11.8	10	58.8	2	11.8	17	100.0
9	0	0.0	0	0.0	16	100.0	0	0.0	16	100.0
10	0	0.0	0	0.0	15	100.0	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	0	0.0	0	0.0	11	100.0	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	0	0.0	2	18.2	9	81.8	0	0.0	11	100.0
All Cases	12	6.3	10	5.3	165	87.3	2	1.1	189	100.0

Table J.5 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 1.4

Case	Unsatisfactory		Marginally Satisfactory		Satisfactory		Not Applicable		All Ratings	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	0	0.0	1	7.1	13	92.9	0	0.0	14	100.0
2	0	0.0	5	29.4	12	70.6	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	1	5.6	1	5.6	16	88.9	0	0.0	18	100.0
5	0	0.0	1	5.6	17	94.4	0	0.0	18	100.0
6	0	0.0	4	22.2	14	77.8	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	5	29.4	3	17.6	8	47.1	1	5.9	17	100.0
9	1	6.3	1	6.3	14	87.5	0	0.0	16	100.0
10	1	6.7	3	20.0	11	73.3	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	2	18.2	2	18.2	7	63.6	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	1	9.1	0	0.0	10	90.9	0	0.0	11	100.0
All Cases	11	5.8	21	11.1	156	82.5	1	0.5	189	100.0

Table J.6 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 1.5

Case	Unsatisfactory		Marginally Satisfactory		Satisfactory		Not Applicable		All Ratings	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	1	7.1	1	7.1	12	85.7	0	0.0	14	100.0
2	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	0	0.0	1	5.9	16	94.1	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	0	0.0	0	0.0	18	100.0	0	0.0	18	100.0
5	0	0.0	0	0.0	18	100.0	0	0.0	18	100.0
6	0	0.0	0	0.0	18	100.0	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	0	0.0	1	5.9	16	94.1	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	1	5.9	0	0.0	15	88.2	1	5.9	17	100.0
9	0	0.0	0	0.0	16	100.0	0	0.0	16	100.0
10	0	0.0	1	6.7	14	93.3	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	0	0.0	0	0.0	11	100.0	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	0	0.0	1	9.1	10	90.9	0	0.0	11	100.0
All Cases	2	1.1	5	2.6	181	95.8	1	0.5	189	100.0

Table J.7
Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 1.6

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally factory	Satisf	factory	Not Ap	plicable	All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	1	7.1	0	0.0	12	85.7	1	7.1	14	100.0
2	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	1	5.9	1	5.9	15	88.2	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	0	0.0	3	16.7	15	83.3	0	0.0	18	100.0
5	1	5.6	0	0.0	17	94.4	0	0.0	18	100.0
6	0	0.0	0	0.0	16	88.9	2	11.1	18	100.0
7	0	0.0	0	0.0	15	88.2	2	11.8	17	100.0
8	0	0.0	1	5.9	15	88.2	1	5.9	17	100.0
9	0	0.0	0	0.0	14	87.5	2	12.5	16	100.0
10	1	6.7	0	0.0	12	80.0	2	13.3	15	100.0
11	0	0.0	0	0.0	10	90.9	1	9.1	11	100.0
12	1	9.1	0	0.0	9	81.8	1	9.1	11	100.0
All Cases	5	2.6	5	2.6	167	88.4	12	6.3	189	100.0

Table J.8 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 1.7

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally factory	Satis	factory	Not Ap	plicable	All Ratings	
	Count	Percent	Count	<b>Percent</b>	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	<u>Count</u>	Percent
1	1	7.1	1	7.1	11	78.6	1	7.1	14	100.0
2	1	5.9	1	5.9	15	88.2	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	4	23.5	1	5.9	11	64.7	1	5.9	17	100.0
4	4	22.2	0	0.0	10	55.6	4	22.2	18	100.0
5	0	0.0	0	0.0	15	83.3	3	16.7	18	100.0
6	6	33.3	1	5.6	9	50.0	2	11.1	18	100.0
7	2	11.8	1	5.9	14	82.4	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	3	17.6	0	0.0	12	70.6	2	11.8	17	100.0
9	6	37.5	2	12.5	6	37.5	2	12.5	16	100.0
10	4	26.7	0	0.0	10	66.7	1	6.7	15	100.0
11	1	9.1	1	9.1	9	81.8	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	8	72.7	1	9.1	1	9.1	1	9.1	11	100.0
All Cases	40	21.2	9	4.8	123	65.1	17	9.0	189	100.0

Table J.9
Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 2.1

Case	Unsati	sfactory	,	ginally factory			Not Ap	plicable	All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	3	23.1	2	15.4	8	61.5	0	0.0	13	100.0
2	4	23.5	5	29.4	8	47.1	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	4	23.5	3	17.6	9	52.9	1	5.9	17	100.0
4	3	17.6	1	5.9	7	41.2	6	35.3	17	100.0
5	0	0.0	1	5.6	11	61.1	6	33.3	18	100.0
6	5	27.8	2	11.1	10	55.6	1	5.6	18	100.0
7	14	82.4	1	5.9	2	11.8	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	2	11.8	3	17.6	8	47.1	4	23.5	17	100.0
9	3	18.8	1	6.3	10	62.5	2	12.5	16	100.0
10	5	33.3	2	13.3	7	46.7	1	6.7	15	100.0
11	6	54.5	2	18.2	3	27.3	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	5	45.5	3	27.3	3	27.3	0	0.0	11	100.0
All Cases	54	28.9	26	13.9	86	46.0	21	11.2	187	100.0

Table J.10 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 2.2

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally factory	Satist	factory	Not Applicat		All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	3	23.1	0	0.0	7	53.8	3	23.1	13	100.0
2	2	11.8	1	5.9	12	70.6	2	11.8	17	100.0
3	1	5.9	3	17.6	9	52.9	4	23.5	17	100.0
4	2	11.1	0	0.0	9	50.0	7	38.9	18	100.0
5	1	5.6	1	5.6	10	55.6	6	33.3	18	100.0
6	3	16.7	2	11.1	11	61.1	2	11.1	18	100.0
7	8	47.1	3	17.6	4	23.5	2	11.8	17	100.0
8	1	5.9	2	11.8	9	52.9	5	29.4	17	100.0
9	2	12.5	0	0.0	10	62.5	4	25.0	16	100.0
10	3	20.0	1	6.7	10	66.7	1	6.7	15	100.0
11	1	9.1	2	18.2	7	63.6	1	9.1	11	100.0
12	3	33.3	1	11.1	2	22.2	3	33.3	9	100.0
All Cases	30	16.1	16	8.6	100	53.8	40	21.5	186	100.0

Table J.11 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 2.3

Case	Unsatisfactory		,	Marginally Satisfactory Satisfac		factory	Not Applicable		All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	3	23.1	1	7.7	7	53.8	2	15.4	13	100.0
2	4	23.5	4	23.5	9	52.9	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	5	29.4	3	17.6	7	41.2	2	11.8	17	100.0
4	2	11.1	2	11.1	8	44.4	6	33.3	18	100.0
5	0	0.0	1	5.6	11	61.1	6	33.3	18	100.0
6	6	33.3	2	11.1	10	55.6	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	15	88.2	1	5.9	1	5.9	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	0	0.0	2	11.8	11	64.7	4	23.5	17	100.0
9	1	6.3	1	6.3	11	68.8	3	18.8	16	100.0
10	5	33.3	1	6.7	8	53.3	1	6.7	15	100.0
11	5	45.5	3	27.3	3	27.3	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	5	45.5	4	36.4	2	18.2	0	0.0	11	100.0
All Cases	51	27.1	25	13.3	88	46.8	24	12.8	188	100.0

Table J.12 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 3.1

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally actory	Satisfactory		Not Ap	plicable	All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	2	14.3	3	21.4	9	64.3	0	0.0	14	100.0
2	1	5.9	2	11.8	14	82.4	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	4	23.5	2	11.8	11	64.7	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	3	16.7	2	11.1	13	72.2	0	0.0	18	100.0
5	1	5.6	3	16.7	14	77.8	0	0.0	18	100.0
6	2	11.1	4	22.2	12	66.7	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	3	18.8	4	25.0	9	56.3	0	0.0	16	100.0
8	0	0.0	2	11.8	15	88.2	0	0.0	17	100.0
9	0	0.0	2	13.3	13	86.7	0	0.0	15	100.0
10	2	13.3	2	13.3	11	73.3	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	1	9.1	0	0.0	10	90.9	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	2	18.2	2	18.2	7	63.6	0	0.0	11	100.0
All Cases	21	11.2	28	15.0	138	73.8	0	0.0	187	100.0

Table J.13 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 3.2

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally actory	Satist	factory	Not Ap	plicable	All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	3	21.4	1	7.1	10	71.4	0	0.0	14	100.0
2	0	0.0	1	5.9	16	94.1	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	2	11.8	5	29.4	10	58.8	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	4	22.2	2	11.1	12	66.7	0	0.0	18	100.0
5	0	0.0	2	11.1	16	88.9	0	0.0	18	100.0
6	1	5.6	5	27.8	12	66.7	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	3	17.6	2	11.8	12	70.6	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	1	5.9	0	0.0	16	94.1	0	0.0	17	100.0
9	2	12.5	0	0.0	14	87.5	0	0.0	16	100.0
10	2	13.3	2	13.3	11	73.3	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	0	0.0	0	0.0	11	100.0	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	3	27.3	0	0.0	8	72.7	0	0.0	11	100.0
All Cases	21	11.1	20	10.6	148	78.3	0	0.0	189	100.0

Table J.14
Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 3.3

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally actory	Satist	factory	Not Ap	plicable	All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	2	14.3	1	7.1	11	78.6	0	0.0	14	100.0
2	1	5.9	0	0.0	16	94.1	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	0	0.0	2	11.8	15	88.2	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	94.4	1	5.6	18	100.0
5	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
6	0	0.0	0	0.0	18	100.0	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	1	5.9	0	0.0	16	94.1	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
9	0	0.0	1	6.3	15	93.8	0	0.0	16	100.0
10	1	6.7	0	0.0	14	93.3	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	0	0.0	0	0.0	11	100.0	0	0.0	11	100.0
12	1	9.1	0	0.0	10	90.9	0	0.0	11	100.0
A 11										
All Cases	6	3.2	4	2.1	177	94.1	1	0.5	188	100.0

Table J.15 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 3.4

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally actory			Not Applicable		All Ratings	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	2	14.3	0	0.0	3	21.4	9	64.3	14	100.0
2	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	29.4	12	70.6	17	100.0
3	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	29.4	12	70.6	17	100.0
4	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	22.2	14	77.8	18	100.0
5	1	5.6	0	0.0	3	16.7	14	77.8	18	100.0
6	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	22.2	14	77.8	18	100.0
7	0	0.0	0	0.0	9	52.9	8	47.1	17	100.0
8	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	29.4	12	70.6	17	100.0
9	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	18.8	13	81.3	16	100.0
10	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	20.0	12	80.0	15	100.0
11	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	27.3	8	72.7	11	100.0
12	1	9.1	0	0.0	1	9.1	9	81.8	11	100.0
All Cases	4	2.1	0	0.0	48	25.4	137	72.5	189	100.0

Table J.16 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 3.5

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally factory			Not Applicable		All Ratings	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	1	7.1	0	0.0	6	42.9	7	50.0	14	100.0
2	0	0.0	0	0.0	12	70.6	5	29.4	17	100.0
3	0	0.0	0	0.0	15	88.2	2	11.8	17	100.0
4	0	0.0	0	0.0	14	77.8	4	22.2	18	100.0
5	0	0.0	1	5.6	11	61.1	6	33.3	18	100.0
6	0	0.0	0	0.0	14	77.8	4	22.2	18	100.0
7	0	0.0	0	0.0	9	52.9	8	47.1	17	100.0
8	0	0.0	0	0.0	13	76.5	4	23.5	17	100.0
9	0	0.0	0	0.0	15	93.8	1	6.3	16	100.0
10	0	0.0	0	0.0	7	46.7	8	53.3	15	100.0
11	1	9.1	0	0.0	6	54.5	4	36.4	11	100.0
12	1	9.1	1	9.1	5	45.5	4	36.4	11	100.0
All Cases	3	1.6	2	1.1	127	67.2	57	30.2	189	100.0

Table J.17 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 4.1

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally factory	Satist	factory	Not Ap	plicable	All Ratings	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	2	14.3	1	7.1	11	78.6	0	0.0	14	100.0
2	4	23.5	2	11.8	11	64.7	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	11	64.7	1	5.9	5	29.4	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	12	66.7	2	11.1	4	22.2	0	0.0	18	100.0
5	3	16.7	1	5.6	14	77.8	0	0.0	18	100.0
6	14	77.8	0	0.0	4	22.2	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	11	64.7	3	17.6	3	17.6	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	14	82.4	0	0.0	3	17.6	0	0.0	17	100.0
9	6	37.5	2	12.5	8	50.0	0	0.0	16	100.0
10	6	40.0	2	13.3	7	46.7	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	5	50.0	3	30.0	2	20.0	0	0.0	10	100.0
12	9	81.8	1	9.1	1	9.1	0	0.0	11	100.0
All Cases	97	51.6	18	9.6	73	38.8	0	0.0	188	100.0

Table J.18 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 4.2

Case	Unsati	sfactory		ginally actory	Satist	factory	Not Ap	plicable	All R	atings
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	0	0.0	0	0.0	12	92.3	1	7.7	13	100.0
2	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	100.0	0	0.0	17	100.0
3	2	11.8	1	5.9	14	82.4	0	0.0	17	100.0
4	2	11.8	0	0.0	15	88.2	0	0.0	17	100.0
5	2	11.8	1	5.9	14	82.4	0	0.0	17	100.0
6	3	16.7	0	0.0	15	83.3	0	0.0	18	100.0
7	7	41.2	0	0.0	10	58.8	0	0.0	17	100.0
8	5	29.4	1	5.9	11	64.7	0	0.0	17	100.0
9	2	12.5	0	0.0	14	87.5	0	0.0	16	100.0
10	1	6.7	0	0.0	14	93.3	0	0.0	15	100.0
11	1	10.0	1	10.0	8	80.0	0	0.0	10	100.0
12	4	36.4	0	0.0	5	45.5	2	18.2	11	100.0
All Cases	29	15.7	4	2.2	149	80.5	3	1.6	185	100.0

Table J.19 Frequency and Percent of Raters by Case for Item 5.0

Case	Unsatisfactory		Marginally Satisfactory		Satisfactory		Not Applicable		All Ratings	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
1	10	71.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	28.6	14	100.0
2	10	66.7	0	0.0	2	13.3	3	20.0	15	100.0
3	4	23.5	0	0.0	1	5.9	12	70.6	17	100.0
4	4	22.2	1	5.6	0	0.0	13	72.2	18	100.0
5	15	83.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	16.7	18	100.0
6	2	12.5	1	6.3	0	0.0	13	81.3	16	100.0
7	1	6.7	3	20.0	0	0.0	10	66.7	15	100.0
8	5	33.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	10	66.7	15	100.0
9	8	50.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	50.0	16	100.0
10	2	14.3	1	7.1	2	14.3	9	64.3	14	100.0
11	3	27.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	72.7	11	100.0
12	4	36.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	7	63.6	11	100.0
All Cases	68	37.8	6	3.3	6	3.3	100	55.6	180	100.0

## Appendix K

**Item Rating Distribution Graphs** 

#### **Illustration of Graph Analysis**

The following illustrates how the graphs in this appendix were used to assess inter-rater agreement. Figure K-1 shows the distribution of ratings by case for Item 1.2 (Conduct of Leads). The red or lower portion of the bar represents the proportion of Unsatisfactory ratings for each case; the green or middle bar represents the proportion of Marginally Satisfactory ratings; and the blue or top bar signifies the proportion of Satisfactory ratings. With the exception of Case 5, which was rated Satisfactory by 90% of the raters, there was a fair amount of disagreement about how well the investigations met the requirements of E.O. 12986 investigative standards. Cases 4 and 12 are particularly illustrative of rating disagreements with the ratings almost evenly split between Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory. See Appendix J for the values represented in the charts.




Figure K.1 Distribution of Ratings by Case for Item 1.2.

Figure K-2 shows the distribution of ratings by case for Item 1.5. Ratings for this item were almost entirely satisfactory. As can be seen in the figure, there was a great deal of agreement amongst raters about how well the investigations reported references' associations with subjects. Through comparison of the rating distribution charts in this appendix, it was possible to identify items with high and low levels of inter-rater agreement.




Figure K.2 Distribution of Ratings by Case for Item 1.5.

# Item Rating Distribution Graphs 1.0 SCOPE




Figure K.3 Rating Distribution for Item 1.1.




Figure K.4 Rating Distribution for Item 1.2.




Figure K.5 Rating Distribution for Item 1.3.




Figure K.6 Rating Distribution for Item 1.4.




Figure K.7 Rating Distribution for Item 1.5.




Figure K.8 Rating Distribution for Item 1.6.




Figure K.9 Rating Distribution for Item 1.7.




Figure K.10 Rating Distribution for Item 2.1.




Figure K.11 Rating Distribution for Item 2.2.




Figure K.12 Rating Distribution for Item 2.3.

### **3.0 PRESENTATION** 100 -90• 80 -70 -60 **-**50 -40 -ITEM 3.1 30 -SAT 20 -Percent MARG 10 -UNSAT Case

Figure K.13 Rating Distribution for Item 3.1.




Figure K.14 Rating Distribution for Item 3.2.




Figure K.15 Rating Distribution for Item 3.3.




Figure K.16 Rating Distribution for Item 3.4.




Figure K.17 Rating Distribution for Item 3.5.




Figure K.18 Rating Distribution for Item 4.1.




Figure K.19 Rating Distribution for Item 4.2.

#### **5.0 Decision Recommendation**




Figure K.20 Rating Distribution for Item 5.0.

## Appendix L

Final SSBI Quality Rating Form (SSBI-QRF)

#### SINGLE SCOPE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION QUALITY RATING FORM

Rating Instructions. Check one box to indicate how well the information described in each item below is addressed and presented in the investigative report. Is the information Unsatisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, or Satisfactory? Check NA if the item is not applicable in a particular case. Please refer to the Instructions Manual for definitions and additional explanation of rating procedures.						
	Unsatisfactory		Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	NA	
1.0 Scope				-10 C	-11 2:	
1.1 Investigative Standards. Based on the information in the report of investigation, all investigative elements required by E.O. 12968 were performed.						
1.2 Unsuccessful Attempts. Unsuccessful efforts to accomplish E.O. 12968 investigative requirements were clearly indicated and explained in the report.						
Inadequate Elements. If you checked Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory in Item 1.1, please indicate below which investigative elements were inadequate based on the information provided in the report. (Check all that apply.)    a. Completion of Security Forms						
	neatisfactoric	(ionalement)	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	NA	
2.0 Issue Resolution				Nive		
2.1 Clarification. Discrepant, unclear, or illogical information developed in the investigation was darified.	s [					
Resolution. Potentially disqualifying information reported by the subject or developed in the investigation was resolved.	9 [					
2.3 Unresolved Issues. If you checked Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory in Item 2.2, please indicate below which E.O. 12968 adjudicative issues were inadequately resolved based on the information provided in the report. (Check all that apply.)  A. Allegiance to U.S.						
		Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	NA	
3.0 Presentation	\$ <del>-</del> \$					
3.1 Report Organization. The report was well organized and information was easy to find.						
3.2 Clarity and Accuracy. The report was clearly written, internally consistent, and free of majerrors.	or					
Documentation. All necessary documentation was provided as part of the investigation, including other investigative records and source documents as appropriate.						
4.0 Utility						
4.1 Adequacy for Adjudication. The investigative report provided enough relevant information allow a clearance eligibility determination to be made.	ı to					
4.2 Timeliness of Investigation. The investigation was completed and the report submitted in timely manner.	а					

## Appendix M

Final SSBI Quality Explanation Form (SSBI-QEF)

RATER CODE:	CASE CODE:	INVESTIGATION TYPE: SSBI SSBI-PR

## SSBI QUALITY EXPLANATION FORM (OPTIONAL) Instructions. Please provide a brief explanation for any item on the SSBI Quality Rating Form that you rated as Unsatisfactory or

Instructions. Please provide a brief explanation for any item on the SSBI Quality Rating Form that you rated as Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory. The explanation should provide enough information for the reviewer to understand which elements of the investigation were deficient and why. Write the item number in the first column. Describe the deficiency in the second column. Please draw a line across the page to separate explanations for ratings of different items.

Item	Rating	Explanation (Including page numbers as appropriate)

# Appendix N

**Instruction Manual for the SSBI-QRF and SSBI-QEF** 

### DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH CENTER

# Instructions for Completing the Single Scope Background Investigation Quality Rating Form (SSBI-QRF)

January 2004

PERSEREC
99 Pacific Street • Suite 455E
Monterey, California 93940
Phone 831.657.3000 • Fax 831.657.0153

# **Table of Contents**

1. Purpose of the SSBI-QRF	6
2. SSBI-QRF Content	6
3. Rating Options and Definitions	7
Four-Category Rating Scale	7
Check-Boxes	8
4. Instructions for Completing the SSBI-QRF	8
Instructions for Recording Identifying Information	8
Instructions for Rating Scope Items	9
Instructions for Rating Issue Resolution Items	11
Instructions for Rating Presentation Items	14
Instructions for Rating Utility Items	15
5. Instructions for Completing the SSBI Quality Explanation Form	16
6. Sample Completed SSBI-QRF	17
Identifying Information	17
Scope Ratings	17
Issue Resolution Ratings	18
Presentation Ratings	
Utility Ratings	19
7. Sample Completed SSBI Quality Explanation Form (Optional)	19

# 1. Purpose of the SSBI-QRF

The purpose of the Single Scope Background Investigation Quality Rating Form (SSBI-QRF) is to assess the quality of personnel security investigations from different providers. The SSBI-QRF primarily addresses the investigative standards and adjudication guidelines from Executive Order (E.O.) 12968. Regular use of this form will enhance existing investigation quality assurance programs by making the process of evaluating investigations more systematic and analytical.

The SSBI-QRF was designed to be used by agencies responsible for making clearance eligibility determinations, for supervising and training investigators, and for oversight and monitoring of investigation products. For example, the form can be used by:

- Adjudicators to provide regular or periodic feedback to investigation providers;
- Supervisors and instructors to provide performance feedback to investigators as part of professional development and training;
- Contract monitors to help monitor contract performance and give feedback to investigation providers; and
- Independent evaluators to periodically rate investigation quality.

This kind of systematic feedback has the potential to improve the quality of Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBIs) so that they can better support clearance eligibility determinations.

The remainder of this document provides instructions for completing the SSBI-QRF and the optional SSBI Quality Explanation Form (SSBI-QEF).

# 2. SSBI-QRF Content

The SSBI-QRF is designed to assess the quality of SSBIs along four dimensions: scope, issue resolution, presentation, and utility. These dimensions represent the basic elements that characterize the investigation product, including both its content and format. Each dimension consists of a number of items, which further specify and clarify the dimension by identifying the specific elements of the investigation that will be rated. These dimensions are:

- Scope. Scope covers the extent to which all investigative elements required by E.O. 12968 were conducted during the investigation. If elements are missing, the investigation may be incomplete and ineligible for further processing. The Scope dimension consists of three items. The first item (1.1) assesses the extent to which all investigative elements required by E.O. 12968 were performed, while the second item (1.2) assesses whether or not unsuccessful efforts to accomplish E.O. 12968 investigative requirements were clearly indicated and explained. The third item (1.3) identifies the investigative requirements that were inadequate based on the information in the report.
- **Issue Resolution**. Issue Resolution uses three items to address the extent to which all discrepant, unclear, illogical, and potentially disqualifying information developed in the

investigation was resolved. Relevant issues must be resolved in order for adjudicators to make clearance eligibility determinations. The first item (2.1) assesses the extent to which discrepant, unclear, or illogical information apparent in the report was clarified, and the second item (2.2) assesses the degree to which potentially disqualifying information reported by the Subject or developed in the investigation was resolved. The third item (2.3) identifies the adjudicative issues (E.O. 12968), if any, that were inadequately resolved based on the information provided in the report.

- **Presentation**. Presentation describes the organization, clarity, and accuracy of the report as well as the extent to which all necessary documentation was provided. Information must be clearly reported and well documented to support adjudication. Three Presentation items rate the extent to which the investigative report was well organized and information was easy to find (item 3.1); was clearly written, internally consistent, and free of major errors (item 3.2); and included all necessary documentation (item 3.3).
- Utility. The Utility dimension provides an overall assessment of the usefulness of the investigative report for making clearance eligibility determinations. Two Utility items describe the timeliness of the report (item 4.2), and the extent to which it provided sufficient relevant information to allow a clearance eligibility determination to be made (item 4.1).

# 3. Rating Options and Definitions

Two different formats are utilized to record ratings: a four-category satisfaction rating scale and check-boxes for selecting specific elements.

# **Four-Category Rating Scale**

The four-category rating scale requires the rater to evaluate the item using one of four rating options. Figure 1 shows the definitions of the four rating options.

- *Unsatisfactory*: available information is <u>not sufficient</u> and corrective action may be needed before an eligibility determination can be made.
- *Marginally Satisfactory*: available information is <u>barely sufficient</u> for making an eligibility determination.
- **Satisfactory**: the information in the report is <u>definitely sufficient</u> for making an eligibility determination.
- *NA*: the item is <u>not applicable</u> in the investigation.

### **Figure 1. Definitions of Rating Options**

Ratings should be based on the rater's understanding of relevant national policy as well as local regulations and guidance, as necessary. However, all raters should utilize the same rating criteria in order for the ratings to be comparable. Since different organizations may have different interpretations of investigative requirements, an effort should be made to ensure that all

raters for a given task share the same criteria for assessing SSBI quality, especially if comparisons are to be made between agencies.

To record their judgment of the extent to which the information in the investigative report has satisfactorily met the requirements described in the item, raters place an "X" in the box below the appropriate rating. Figure 2 illustrates a rating of *Unsatisfactory* for Item 1.1. All items should be rated *Unsatisfactory*, *Marginally Satisfactory*, or *Satisfactory* unless they are not applicable. Only one box per row should be checked.

	Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	NA
1.0 Scope				
1.1 Investigative Standards. Based on the information in the report of investigation, all investigative elements required by E.O. 12968 were performed.	$\boxtimes$			

Figure 2. Example of Response Using Four-Category Rating Scale

### **Check-Boxes**

The check-box format requires the rater to identify the investigative elements that were inadequately conducted or the adjudication guidelines that were inadequately resolved based on the information in the report. To record a response, raters place an "X" next to the elements that were inadequate. Figure 3 illustrates how the check-box format is used to record that the Citizenship and Education elements of an investigation were not adequately conducted based on the information in the report of investigation.

1.3	Inadequate Elements. If you check below which investigative elements all that apply.)		
	<ul><li>a. Completion of Security Forms</li><li>b. Subject NAC</li><li>c. Spouse/Cohabitant NAC</li><li>d. Date and Place of Birth</li><li>e. Citizenship</li><li>f. Education</li></ul>	g. Employment h. References i. Former Spouse j. Neighborhoods k. Financial Review l. Local Agency Checks	m. Public Records n. Subject Interview o. Polygraph (if applicable) p. Expansion of Investigation

Figure 3. Example of Response Using Check-box Format

# 4. Instructions for Completing the SSBI-QRF

# **Instructions for Recording Identifying Information**

Information identifying the rater and case should be recorded in the space provided at the top of the form. Enter the rater code and case code in the space provided. The rater code is to be

designated by the organization conducting the ratings. The case code is the code used to identify the Subject of the investigation. If the case being rated is a Single Scope Background Investigation, check SSBI; if it is a Single Scope Background Investigation - Periodic Reinvestigation, check SSBI-PR. Figure 4 shows the part of the form into which this identifying information is recorded.

RATER CODE:	CASE CODE:	INVESTIGATION TYPE:	SSBI SSBI-PR
-------------	------------	---------------------	--------------

Figure 4. Case Identifying Information

# **Instructions for Rating Scope Items**

Scope covers the elements required by the Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information, and consists of three items as shown in Figure 5.

					AN
	1.0 Scope				
1.1	1.1 Investigative Standards. Based on the information in the report of investigation, all investigative elements required by E.O. 12968 were performed.				
1.2	1.2 Unsuccessful Attempts. Unsuccessful efforts to accomplish E.O. 12968 investigative requirements were clearly indicated and explained in the report.				
1.3	<b>Inadequate Elements</b> . If you checked Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory in below which investigative elements were inadequate based on the information pro (Check all that apply.)				dicate
	b. Subject NAC	Subject Polygra	Record Intervision (if a sion of l	iew applical	

Figure 5. Scope Items Covering the National Investigative Standards (E.O. 12968)

Items 1.1 and 1.2 To record an evaluation of Item 1.1 Investigative Standards and Item 1.2 Unsuccessful Attempts, place an "X" in the box that best represents the appropriate rating. The four rating options are *Unsatisfactory*, *Marginally Satisfactory*, *Satisfactory*, and *NA*, as defined earlier in this manual.

Item 1.3 Inadequate Elements should be completed whenever Item 1.1 Investigative Standards is rated *Unsatisfactory* or *Marginally Satisfactory*. If Item 1.1 was rated *Satisfactory*, skip Item 1.3. To record a response to Item 1.3, place an "X" in the box next to those investigative elements (a

through p) that were inadequate based on the information provided in the report.

Item 1.3 lists the investigative elements required by the National Investigative Standards. More complete definitions of these elements, as provided in E.O. 12968, are as follows.

- a. <u>Completion of Security Forms</u>. Completion of SF86 or EPSQ, including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
- b. <u>Subject National Agency Check (NAC)</u>. Completion of a NAC for the Subject of the investigation.
- c. <u>Spouse/Cohabitant NAC</u>. Completion of a NAC, without fingerprint cards, for the Spouse or Cohabitant.
- d. <u>Date and Place of Birth</u>. Corroboration of date and place of birth through a check of appropriate documentation; a check of Bureau of Vital Statistics (BVS) records when any discrepancy is found to exist.
- e. <u>Citizenship</u>. For individuals born outside the United States, verification of U.S. citizenship directly from the appropriate registration authority; verification of U.S. citizenship or legal status of foreign-born immediate family members (spouse, cohabitant, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters).
- f. <u>Education</u>. Corroboration of most recent or most significant claimed attendance, degree, or diploma. Interviews of appropriate educational sources if education was a primary activity of the Subject during the most recent three years.
- g. <u>Employment</u>. Verification of all employments for the past seven years; personal interviews of two sources (supervisors, co-workers, or both) for each employment of six months or more; corroboration through records or sources of all periods of unemployment exceeding 60 days; verification of all prior federal and military service, including type of discharge. For military members, consider all service within one branch of the armed forces as one employment, regardless of assignments. However, list each individual duty location.
- h. <u>References</u>. Four references, of whom at least two are developed; to the extent practicable, all should have social knowledge of the Subject and collectively span at least the last seven years.
- i. <u>Former Spouse</u>. An interview of any former spouse divorced within the last ten years.

- j. <u>Neighborhoods</u>. Confirmation of *all* residences for the last three years through appropriate interviews with neighbors and through records reviews.
- k. <u>Financial Review</u>. Verification of the Subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where the Subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more for the last seven years.
- Local Agency Checks (LACs). A check of appropriate criminal history records covering all locations where, for the last ten years, the Subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more, including current residence regardless of duration. If no residence, employment, or education exceeds six months, perform local agency checks as deemed appropriate.
- m. <u>Public Records</u>. Verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and other court actions, whether civil or criminal, whether listed on the Subject's security form or developed during the investigation, involving the Subject for the past 10 years.
- n. <u>Subject Interview</u>. A Subject Interview, conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. During the investigation, conduct additional Subject Interviews as required, to collect relevant information, to resolve significant inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements, certified results of interview, and/or unsworn declarations are taken whenever appropriate.
- o. <u>Polygraph (if applicable)</u>. In departments or agencies with policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security purposes, the investigation may include a polygraph examination, conducted by a qualified polygraph examiner.
- p. <u>Expansion of Investigation</u>. Expand the investigation as necessary. As appropriate, conduct interviews with anyone able to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals.

# **Instructions for Rating Issue Resolution Items**

Issue Resolution covers the extent to which discrepant, unclear, illogical, and potentially disqualifying information developed in the investigation was resolved. This dimension consists of three items as shown in Figure 6.

	Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	NA
2.0 Issue Resolution				
2.1 Clarification. Discrepant, unclear, or illogical information developed in the investigation was clarified.				
2.2 <b>Resolution</b> . Potentially disqualifying information reported by the Subject or developed in the investigation was resolved.				
Unresolved Issues. If you checked Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory in Ite below which E.O. 12968 adjudicative issues were inadequately resolved based on in the report. (Check all that apply.)				
B. Foreign Influence G. Alcohol Consumption L	. Outsi	de Acti		
☐ C. Foreign Preference ☐ H. Drug Involvement ☐ N			nforma / Syste	
<ul><li>□ D. Sexual Behavior</li><li>□ I. Emotional/Mental/Personality Disorders</li><li>□ E. Personal Conduct</li><li>□ J. Criminal Conduct</li></ul>			- <b>,</b>	-

Figure 6. Issue Resolution Items Covering the Adjudicative Guidelines (E.O. 12968)

### Items 2.1 and 2.2

To record an evaluation of the first two issue resolution items, Item 2.1 Clarification and Item 2.2 Resolution, place an "X" in the box below the appropriate rating. The four rating options are *Unsatisfactory*, *Marginally Satisfactory*, *Satisfactory*, and *NA*, as defined earlier in this manual.

### **Item 2.3**

Item 2.3 Unresolved Issues should be completed whenever Item 2.2 Resolution is rated *Unsatisfactory* or *Marginally Satisfactory*. (If Item 2.2 was rated *Satisfactory*, skip Item 2.3.) To record a response to Item 2.3, place an "X" in the box next to the adjudicative guidelines (A through M) that were inadequately resolved based on the information provided in the report.

Item 2.3 lists the adjudicative areas. The security concerns relevant to each of these issues are presented below. Refer to the E.O. 12968 for further information, including disqualifying and mitigating conditions for these guidelines.

- A. <u>Allegiance to the United States</u>. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.
- B. <u>Foreign Influence</u>. A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he

or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determination if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

- C. <u>Foreign Preference</u>. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
- D. <u>Sexual Behavior</u>. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, may subject the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. Sexual orientation or preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.
- E. <u>Personal Conduct</u>. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information.
- F. <u>Financial Considerations</u>. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
- G. <u>Alcohol Consumption</u>. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness
- H. <u>Drug Involvement</u>. Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
- I. <u>Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders</u>. Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability or stability.

- J. <u>Criminal Conduct</u>. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
- K. <u>Security Violation</u>. Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.
- L. <u>Outside Activities</u>. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with a individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
- M. <u>Misuse of Information Technology Systems</u>. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information.

### **Instructions for Rating Presentation Items**

Presentation consists of three items that describe the organization, clarity and accuracy of the report, as well as the extent to which all necessary documentation was provided as part of the investigation. The ratings for this dimension are identical to those used for rating items in the other dimensions (i.e., *Unsatisfactory*, *Marginally Satisfactory*, *Satisfactory*, and *NA*). These three items, their definitions, and rating options are shown in Figure 7.

		Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	ΝΑ
3.0 Pi	resentation				
3.1	<b>Report Organization</b> . The report was well organized and information was easy to find.				
3.2	<b>Clarity and Accuracy</b> . The report was clearly written, internally consistent, and free of major errors.				
3.3	<b>Documentation</b> . All necessary documentation was provided as part of the investigation, including other investigative records and source documents as appropriate.				
Figu	re 7. Presentation Items and Rating Options				
Item	Items 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 To record an evaluation of the three Presentation Items (Item 3.1 Report Organization, Item 3.2 Clarity and Accuracy, and Item 3.3				

Items 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 To record an evaluation of the three Presentation Items (Item 3.1 Report Organization, Item 3.2 Clarity and Accuracy, and Item 3.3 Documentation), place an "X" in the box below the appropriate rating. The four rating options are *Unsatisfactory*, *Marginally Satisfactory*, *Satisfactory*, and *NA*, as defined earlier in this manual.

# **Instructions for Rating Utility Items**

The Utility Dimension consists of two items, describing the overall usefulness of the investigative report. The ratings are identical to those used for rating items in the other dimensions (*i.e.*, *Unsatisfactory*, *Marginally Satisfactory*, *Satisfactory*, and *NA*). Figure 8 shows the content of these two items.

		Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	NA
4.0 U	.0 Utility				
4.1	<b>Adequacy for Adjudication</b> . The investigative report provided enough relevant information to allow a clearance eligibility determination to be made.				
4.2	<b>Timeliness of Investigation</b> . The investigation was completed and the report submitted in a timely manner.				

Figure 8. Utility Items and Rating Options

Items 4.1 and 4.2 To record an evaluation of the two Utility Items (Item 4.1 Adequacy for Adjudication and 4.2 Timeliness of Investigation), place an "X" in the box below the appropriate rating. The four rating options are *Unsatisfactory*, *Marginally Satisfactory*, Satisfactory, and NA, as defined earlier in this manual.

# 5. Instructions for Completing the SSBI Quality Explanation Form

The optional SSBI Quality Explanation Form (SSBI-QEF) is designed to record a brief explanation for all items on the SSBI-QRF that were rated *Unsatisfactory* or *Marginally Satisfactory*. The explanation should: (1) identify the item number; (2) provide the rating; and (3) describe which elements of the investigation were deficient and why. Figure 9 shows an example of the SSBI Quality Explanation Form.

**SSBI QUALITY EXPLANATION FORM (OPTIONAL)** 

Investigation Type: 

SSBI SSBI-PR

Case Code:

tem	Rating	Explanation (Including page numbers as appropriate)

Figure 9. SSBI Quality Explanation Form

Rater Code:

# 6. Sample Completed SSBI-QRF

# **Identifying Information**

Figure 10 shows the identifying information for an initial investigation for case 1234, evaluated by rater 001.

RATER CODE: 001	CASE CODE: 1234	INVESTIGATION TYPE:	⊠ SSBI □ SSBI-PR

Figure 10. Sample record of identifying information

# **Scope Ratings**

Figure 11 indicates that, based on the information in the investigative report, some elements required by E.O. 12968 were *Unsatisfactorily* performed (Item 1.1); and unsuccessful efforts to accomplish E.O. 12968 investigative requirements were clearly indicated and explained in the report (Item 1.2) in a *Satisfactory* manner. It also indicates that investigative elements 1.3.d (Date and Place of Birth) and 1.3.e (Citizenship) were **inadequate** based on the information provided in the report.

		Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	NA
	1.0 Scope				
1.1	<b>Investigative Standards</b> . Based on the information in the report of investigation, all investigative elements required by E.O. 12968 were performed.	$\boxtimes$			
1.2	<b>Unsuccessful Attempts</b> . Unsuccessful efforts to accomplish E.O. 12968 investigative requirements were clearly indicated and explained in the report.			$\boxtimes$	
1.3	<b>Inadequate Elements</b> . If you checked Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory in below which investigative elements were inadequate based on the information pro (Check all that apply.)				licate
	b. Subject NAC	Subject Polygra	Record Intervi Iph (if a ion of I	ew pplicat	

Figure 11. Sample Scope Item Ratings

### **Issue Resolution Ratings**

Figure 12 indicates that, based on the information in the investigative report, discrepant, unclear, or illogical information developed in the investigation was clarified (Item 2.1 Clarification) in a *Satisfactory* manner, and that potentially disqualifying information reported by the Subject or developed in the investigation (Item 2.2) was resolved in a *Marginally Satisfactory* manner. It identifies adjudicative issues B (Foreign Influence) and C (Foreign Preference) as being inadequately resolved based on the information provided in the report.

	Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	NA	
2.0 Issue Resolution					
2.1 Clarification. Discrepant, unclear, or illogical information developed in the investigation was clarified.			$\boxtimes$		
2.2 <b>Resolution</b> . Potentially disqualifying information reported by the Subject or developed in the investigation was resolved.					
Unresolved Issues. If you checked Unsatisfactory or Marginally Satisfactory in Item 2.2, please indicate below which E.O. 12968 adjudicative issues were inadequately resolved based on the information provided in the report. (Check all that apply.)					
□ A. Allegiance to the U.S.       □ F. Financial Considerations       □ K. Security Violations         □ B. Foreign Influence       □ G. Alcohol Consumption       □ L. Outside Activities         □ C. Foreign Preference       □ H. Drug Involvement       □ M. Misuse of Information Technology Systems					
☐ D. Sexual Behavior ☐ I. Emotional/Mental/Personality Disorders ☐ J. Criminal Conduct	iology	System	1S		

Figure 12. Sample Issue Resolution Item Ratings

### **Presentation Ratings**

Figure 13 indicates that the organization of the report was *Satisfactory*; information was easy to find (Item 3.1 Organization); and it was clearly written, internally consistent, and free of major errors (Item 3.2 Clarity and Accuracy). However, the report was *Unsatisfactory* in that it did not include all necessary documentation (Item 3.3 Documentation).

		Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	ΑN
3.0 Presentation					
3.1	<b>Report Organization</b> . The report was well organized and information was easy to find.			$\boxtimes$	
3.2	<b>Clarity and Accuracy</b> . The report was clearly written, internally consistent, and free of major errors.			$\boxtimes$	
3.3	<b>Documentation</b> . All necessary documentation was provided as part of the investigation, including other investigative records and source documents as appropriate.	$\boxtimes$			

Figure 13. Sample Presentation Item Ratings

### **Utility Ratings**

Figure 14 indicates that the report was *Unsatisfactory* in that it did not provide enough relevant information to allow a clearance eligibility determination to be made (Item 4.1), but it was *Satisfactory* with respect to timeliness (Item 4.2).

		Unsatisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Satisfactory	NA
4.0 Utility					
4.1	<b>Adequacy for Adjudication</b> . The investigative report provided enough relevant information to allow a clearance eligibility determination to be made.	$\boxtimes$			
4.2	<b>Timeliness of Investigation</b> . The investigation was completed and the report submitted in a timely manner.			$\boxtimes$	

**Figure 14. Sample Utility Items Ratings** 

# 7. Sample Completed SSBI Quality Explanation Form (Optional)

As stated previously, the SSBI-QEF is used to record brief explanations for all items on the SSBI-QRF that are rated *Unsatisfactory* or *Marginally Satisfactory*. In the example below (Figure 15) are explanations for sample items rated *Unsatisfactory* or *Marginally Satisfactory*.

Item	Rating	Explanation (Including page numbers as appropriate)	
1.1	UNSAT	Pg. 8: Subject is listed as being a "Jr." This does not appear to be true, but is not explained and Subject is not questioned about it. Pg. 20: Subject stated his last name was "Smith" until age 5; nothing is done to explain how or why the name was changed. Citizenship was not independently verified with appropriate registration authority.	
		Legal status of foreign-born spouse was not verified.	
2.1	MARG	I would like to see more information regarding foreign connections. Are there any financial ties? One reference stated that Subject and his mother spent time in a militadetention camp. There was no mention of this anywhere else and no follow up.	
3.3	UNSAT	Proof of place of birth and citizenship were not included with the report.	
4.1	UNSAT	The report did not positively confirm citizenship of subject or his spouse. Also, questions remain about Subject's foreign connections. No adjudicative decision can be made without follow-up.	

Figure 15. Example of SSBI Quality Explanation Form Entries